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Introduction
The European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) was drafted in 1950. The Convention was born of its time, in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War. It draws on the bitter lesson learnt 
in all wars, and in that war most of all – that human conflict can only be avoided if 
human relations are based on equality and dignity, and that States can only hope to be 
stable in the long term if they respect the equality and dignity of their communities 
and their people.
65 years on, the importance of the fundamental set of rights and freedoms 
guaranteed by the Convention still holds true. However, in order for the Convention 
to provide its safeguards to all, consistent implementation is paramount – especially 
as the 47 States Parties to the Convention have different legal systems and implemen-
tation methods. The first route, for all people, to take to enforce their Convention 
rights is through the national courts. National courts are often better placed to assess 
whether a violation of a Convention right has occurred – in light of the evidence it 
hears directly, and its knowledge of the domestic law, and the cultural, and socio-eco-
nomic contexts of the particular Member State. The role of the European Court is 
to review whether decisions taken by national authorities are compatible with the 
Convention, having due regard to the State’s margin of appreciation in how to apply 
and implement the Convention, depending on the circumstances of the case and the 
specific rights and freedoms engaged. 
Achieving a better standard of Convention implementation at national level 
has been a continued priority and point of debate in recent years. This discussion was 
first initiated at a conference in Interlaken in 2010, and has been followed by the 2012 
Brighton Declaration, the 2015 Brussels Declaration and the recently presented draft 
Copenhagen Declaration. 
However, the effective national implementation of the Convention depends on 
a general knowledge and understanding of Convention rights and familiarity with 
the Court’s jurisprudence. National judges are only able to give effect to the protected 
rights at national level if they are familiar with and understand the case law of the 
Court. And so it was that at the fourth Regional Rule of Law Forum held in Tirana in 
2017, the idea of creating a handbook or guide on applying Convention case law in 
domestic judgments, was put forward. 
The Regional Rule of Law Forum is held annually by the AIRE Centre and 
Civil Rights Defenders, and is a meeting place for current and former judges from 
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the Strasbourg Court, representatives of the most senior courts and judicial coun-
cils from throughout the region, directors of judicial training institutes, Government 
agents to the Strasbourg Court, legal experts and representatives of the NGO com-
munity. The Forum was established in 2014 after a dialogue with two judges of the 
European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, who were discussing their caseload 
in Strasbourg at the time, and both recognised many common challenges facing the 
countries in the region when it came to the proper application of the Convention. So 
the idea of holding the Forums was born out of the realisation that by encouraging 
and facilitating regional cooperation and dialogue, best practices and lessons could be 
shared: something that is both needed and desirable in order to overcome common 
challenges. 
To create this guide was a natural extension of the discussions held at and con-
clusions emanating from the Forums. We gather participants from South East Europe, 
so it is the particular challenges that they are facing when implementing Convention 
that we aim to address in this publication.
The guide has four sections covering (i) a short introduction to and overview of 
the ECHR, (ii) key concepts of the ECHR, (iii) a look at the system for taking cases to 
the ECtHR and an application’s path through the Strasbourg system, and finally (iv) 
a more in depth consideration of the principles and guidelines for applying ECtHR 
case-law in domestic decision-making. It is our hope that the publication will comple-
ment other thematic publications on the Articles and case law of the ECHR. 
We are looking forward to developing this guide further in cooperation with 
courts and judicial training institutes in the region, and will consult widely on how it 
can best be expanded, with the possibility of creating further practical tools for judges 
and other authorities.  
March 2018
Biljana Braithwaite Catharina Harby
Programme Manager for the Western Balkans,  Senior Legal Consultant, 
the AIRE Centre the AIRE Centre
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List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
BCMS Bosnian/Croatian/Montenegrin/Serbian
European Commission The European Commission of Human Rights 
 (replaced by the European Court of Human Rights)
ECHR European Convention on Human Rights
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights
HUDOC Official database of the European Court 
 of Human Rights
Human Rights Committee United Nations Human Rights Committee
ILO International Labour Organisation
Strasbourg Court European Court of Human Rights
Venice Commission European Commission for Democracy through Law
Note: “the Court” with a capital first letter is used to denote the European 
Court of Human Rights; where a reference to domestic courts is made, “the court” is 
written with a lower-case first letter.
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Chapter 1
Short introduction to and overview 
of the ECHR
I. Genesis and reform
The European Convention on Human Rights was signed1 in Rome on 4 November 1950, in the aftermath of WWII, and entered into force on 3 September 1953. It is the first and maybe the most important Con-
vention of the Council of Europe, an international organisation currently consisting 
of 47 member States (28 of these States are at the time of writing also members of the 
European Union) that was created with the aim to unify its members after the war. 
Accordingly, the Convention was conceived as a response to the atrocities committed 
during WWII; a document providing a much needed framework for the protection 
of fundamental rights and freedoms on an international level. It has been innovatory 
in the field of international law, in that it recognised a genuine right of individuals to 
take legal action at international level when all domestic remedies have failed.2
Since its entry into force, several Protocols have been adopted, not all of which 
have, however, been ratified by all Contracting States. Some of these introduced ad-
ditional rights, whereas some concerned procedural issues. Two major reforms of the 
system have been realised, both of which aimed to address the increasing caseload of 
the Court: (i) adopted in 1994, Protocol No. 11 most notably established a new single 
Court that replaced the initially formed part-time Court and the European Commis-
sion of Human Rights. The Commission’s decisions form part of the Court’s case law 
and are still valid today unless subsequent case law has amended their findings; (ii) in 
2009, Protocol No. 14 was adopted as a way to introduce further urgent procedural 
1 The Convention was initially signed by 12 - out of the 15 in total - States that were members of the Council of Eu-
rope at the time. Signature and ratification of the Convention is a prerequisite for joining the Council of Europe; 
all its current members have signed and ratified it.
2 It should be noted that for many years the right of individual “petition” (with Protocol 11 the term “petition” 
turned to “application”) was optional: the Court’s jurisdiction to examine complaints by individuals or non-gov-
ernmental organisations was subject to the condition that the State concerned had declared that it accepted such 
jurisdiction. Since Protocol 11, the jurisdiction of the Court, as provided in Article 34 of the Convention, has 
become mandatory (see Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 11 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, restructuring the control machinery established thereby, para. 85).
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changes. These pertained more “to the functioning than the structure of the Court”3 
and were aimed at reducing the time spent by the Court on unmeritorious or repet-
itive applications so that it concentrates on the most important cases that require 
in-depth examination4,5.
At present, a further two Protocols have been adopted and await entry into 
force: Protocol No. 15, which, inter alia, introduces an explicit reference to the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation6 in the preamble to 
the Convention as well as some changes regarding the admissibility criteria7; and Pro-
tocol No. 16, the so-called “Dialogue Protocol”8, which aims to facilitate the dialogue 
between the ECtHR and the domestic courts via the medium of advisory opinions9.
II. The nature of the rights guaranteed in the Convention
The Convention, including its Protocols, protects predominantly civil and po-
litical rights, placing less emphasis on economic, social or cultural rights10. The pro-
tection of property, the right to education, and the provision guaranteeing equality 
between spouses are the few exceptions of such rights protected directly via a relevant 
provision in the text of the Convention. Nonetheless, the Court has stressed that there 
is no water-tight division separating the sphere of social and economic rights from 
3 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, para. 35.
4 Id. paras. 35-37 and 79.
5 The main changes include the introduction of the single judge formation (Article 27), the expansion of the com-
petences of the Committee of three judges (Article 28), a new admissibility criterion in Article 35(3) b, and the 
possibility to reach friendly settlements at any stage of the proceedings (Article 39).
6 See Chapter 2.V.
7 Shortening from six to four months the time limit within which an application must be made to the Court, and 
amending the ‘significant disadvantage’ admissibility criterion (see Chapter 3.II.i.).
8 Dean Spielmann, International conference “Application of the European Convention on Human Rights and fun-
damental freedoms on national level and the role of national judges”, 24-25 October 2014, Opening remarks.
9 See Chapter 3.II.ii.
10 Social and economic rights are mainly protected within the 1961 European Social Charter or the revised 1996 
European Social Charter which is meant to gradually replace the 1961 Charter. Compliance with the rights set out 
in both Charters is subject to a supervisory and not a judiciary mechanism; a quasi-judicial system of collective 
complaints is, however, in place for the countries that have ratified the 1995 Additional Protocol to the European 
Social Charter. All countries of the Western Balkans that are members of the Council of Europe have ratified the 
1996 European Social Charter but not the 1995 Additional Protocol. Certain cultural rights are being protected 
within separate treaties adopted by the member States of the Council of Europe (e.g. European Charter for Re-
gional or Minority Language). 
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the field covered by the Convention, as many of the civil and political rights that it 
protects do have implications of a social or economic nature (Airey v. Ireland11).
The Court has thus developed a body of jurisprudence where it has accorded 
indirect protection to certain social and economic rights; it has done so via the in-
terpretation of various Articles of the Convention and/or the recognition of certain 
positive obligations of the States. Examples of some aspects of such rights examined 
by the Court include: access to health care12, fair working conditions13, issues related 
to the right to housing14, the right to bargain collectively with the employer15, and the 
protection of social security contributions16,17 
Similarly, regarding cultural rights, the Court has gradually recognised sub-
stantive rights falling under this category, covering issues such as artistic expression, 
access to culture, cultural identity, linguistic rights, education, the protection of cul-
tural and natural heritage, the right to seek historical truth and the right to academic 
freedom, particularly in light of an increasing number of cases brought before it by 
individuals or entities belonging to national minorities18.
11 Airey v. Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979, no. 6289/73, para. 26.
12 See, for example, Panaitescu v. Romania, judgment of 10 April 2012, no. 30909/06 (on the basis of Article 2) and 
D. v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 2 May 1997, no. 30240/96 (on the basis of Article 3).
13 See, for example, Siliadin v. France, judgment of 26 July 2005, no. 73316/01 and Chowdury and Others v. Greece, 
judgment of 30 March 2017, no. 21884/15 (on the basis of Article 4).
14 See, for example, Connors v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 27 May 2004, no. 66746/01, paras. 81-95 re-
garding force evictions (on the basis of Article 8); Fadeyeva v. Russia, judgment of 9 June 2005, no. 55723/00, 
regarding exposure to unhealthy living conditions (on the basis of Article 8); Cyprus v. Turkey, [Grand Chamber] 
judgment of 10 May 2001, no. 25781/94, regarding the rights of displaced peoples (on the basis of Article 1 of 
Protocol 1); Moldovan and Others v. Romania (No. 2), judgment of 12 July 2005, nos. 41138/98 and 64320/01, 
in which case the applicants’ living conditions and the racial discrimination to which they had been publicly 
subjected amounted, in the special circumstances of the case, to “degrading treatment” within the meaning of 
Article 3 (paras. 93-114). The Court also found a violation of Article 8 and of Article 14 taken in conjunction with 
Articles 6 and 8.
15 See, for example, Demir and Baykara v. Turkey, judgment [Grand Chamber] of 12 November 2008, no. 34503/97, 
paras. 140-154 (light of the “right to form and to join trade unions” set forth in Article 11).
16 See, for example, Stec and Others v. The United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] decision of 6 July 2005, nos. 
65731/01 and 65900/01, paras. 49-56, (on the basis of Article 1 of Protocol 1).
17 For an extensive research on the indirect protection of social and economic rights through civil and political 
rights, see “Courts and the Legal Enforcement of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Comparative experiences 
of justiciability”, International Commission of Jurists, 2008.
18 Research report “Cultural rights in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights”, Research division, 
Council of Europe/European Court of Human Rights, January 2011 (updated 17 January 2017), retrieved on 17 
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It should be noted that the protection of these rights and freedoms under the 
Convention system is meant to provide a minimum standard of protection and can-
not be construed as limiting more extensive protection guaranteed by national law or 
other international agreements (Article 53)19.
 
III. Overview of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto
The Convention consists of Article 1, and Sections I, II, and III. At present, six 
Protocols are annexed to the main text of the Convention providing for additional 
rights and freedoms. These are going to be presented along with the rights and free-
doms guaranteed in Section I of the Convention; other than that, the present overview 
follows the order of the provisions in the Convention.
Article 1
Article 1 imposes a general obligation on States to secure the protection of the 
Convention rights and freedoms to anyone within their jurisdiction. This jurisdiction 
is primarily territorial: as a rule, the States are liable for events taking place on their 
territory; the Court has, however, recognised a number of exceptional circumstances 
capable of giving rise to the exercise of jurisdiction by a State outside its own territo-
rial boundaries (see below where Section II of the Convention is discussed, namely 
the competence ratione loci of the Court). It is to be read along with Article 56, which 
gives the possibility to a State to declare that the Convention extends to all or any of 
the territories for whose international relations it is responsible. The primarily territo-
rial nature of the jurisdiction, however, is not to be seen as contradictory to the States’ 
liability for their sovereign acts outside their territory or their obligation to take into 
consideration certain consequences of actions or decisions taken in their own territo-
ry that unfold in the territory of another State (for example, in deportation proceed-
ings consideration must be given to the fact that there is a real risk that an individual 
will be subjected to prohibited treatment if deported to another State).
Article 1 also provides the legal basis for the recognition of the States’ positive 
obligations20, and it has played a central role in the evolution of the principle that the 
rights and freedoms set out in the Convention are practical and effective, not theoret-
ical and illusory21.
January 2017 from: http://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Research_report_cultural_rights_ENG.pdf.
19 See Chapter 2.V.iii.
20 See Chapter 2.VII.
21 See Chapter 2VI.ii.
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Section I: Rights and freedoms
Section I of the Convention comprises Articles 2-18. Articles 2-14 enunciate 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention, whereas Articles 15-18 set out 
some interpretative means for the understanding of the scope of these rights; further 
rights and freedoms are included in the annexed Protocols of the Convention.
The rights and freedoms guaranteed in Section I
• Right to life (Article 2)
• Prohibition of torture (Article 3)
• Prohibition of slavery and forced labour (Article 4)
• Right to liberty and security (Article 5)
• Right to a fair trial (Article 6)
• No punishment without law (Article 7)
• Right to respect for private and family life (Article 8)
• Freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9)
• Freedom of expression (Article 10)
• Freedom of assembly and association (Article 11)
• Right to marry (Article 12)
• Right to an effective remedy (Article 13)
• Prohibition of discrimination (Article 14)
Articles 15-18
• Derogation in time of emergency (Article 15)
• Restrictions on political activity of aliens (Article 16)
• Prohibition of abuse of rights (Article 17)
• Limitation on use of restrictions on rights (Article 18)  
The substantive rights and freedoms guaranteed in the annexed Protocols
Protocol 1
• Protection of property (Article 1 Protocol 1)
• The right to education (Article 2 Protocol 1)
• The right to free elections (Article 3 Protocol 1)
Protocol 4
• Prohibition of imprisonment for debt (Article 1 Protocol 4)
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• Freedom of movement (Article 2 Protocol 4)
• Prohibition of expulsion of nationals (Article 3 Protocol 4)
• Prohibition of collective expulsion of aliens (Article 4 Protocol 4)
Protocol 6
• Abolition of the Death Penalty (Article 1 Protocol 6)
• Death penalty in time of war (Article 2 Protocol 6)
• Prohibition of derogations (Article 3 Protocol 6)
• Prohibition of reservations (Article 4 Protocol 6)
Protocol 7
• Procedural safeguards relating to expulsion of aliens (Article 1 Protocol 7)
• Right of appeal in criminal matters (Article 2 Protocol 7)
• Compensation for wrongful conviction (Article 3 Protocol 7)
• Right not to be tried or punished twice (Article 4 Protocol 7)
• Equality between spouses (Article 5 Protocol 7)
Protocol 12
• General prohibition of discrimination (Article 1 Protocol 12)
Protocol 13
• Abolition of the death penalty (Article 1 Protocol 13)
• Prohibition of derogations (Article 2 Protocol 13)
• Prohibition of reservations (Article 3 Protocol 13)
Section II: The Court
Section II of the Convention comprises Articles 19-5122 which contain provi-
sions regarding the purpose of the Court, its composition and structure, its jurisdic-
tion and competence, its deliberation mechanisms and aspects of the procedure be-
fore it. This section is supplemented by the Rules of Court and the Practice Directions 
that are issued by the President of the Court to provide clarification on aspects of the 
Court’s procedure23.
22 The following grouping of these Articles serves analytical reasons only.
23 Available at: http://www.echr.coe.int/Pages/home.aspx?p=basictexts/rules#n1347877334990_pointer
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• Article 19 sets out the Court’s function, which is to ensure that the 
Contracting States abide by their obligations under the Convention and its 
Protocols. It is often invoked to indicate the boundaries of the role of the 
Court as opposed to the responsibilities of the States (Article 1),24 and the 
role of the Committee of Ministers (Article 46)25.
• Articles 20 - 31 concern the Court’s composition, its supporting staff, and 
its organisation in different formations (plenary Court26, single judges, 
Committees of three judges, Chambers, and Grand Chamber), including 
the competence of each of these27.
• Article 32 - 35 delineate the jurisdiction and competence of the Court as 
well as criteria regarding the admissibility of an application. The admissi-
bility criteria are further considered in Chapter 3.28
Competence ratione materiae: the Court may examine applications regarding 
rights that are protected by the Convention and its Protocols. If a complaint concerns 
a situation that falls outside the scope of these rights, the application - in part or in 
its entirety - will be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto. Also, complaints based on a provision in 
respect of which the respondent State has made a valid reservation under Article 57 
will be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae – the validity of a State’s reservation 
is assessed by the Court29.
Competence ratione personae: the alleged violation of the Convention must 
have been committed by a Contracting State or be in some way attributable to it. Also, 
the applicant must have standing according to Article 34 and be a “victim”30 of the 
particular violation alleged.
Competence ratione loci: the Court shall only examine applications regard-
ing complaints of actions that took (or will take) place within the jurisdiction of a 
Contracting State. Two situations give rise to exercise of jurisdiction by a State out-
side its own territorial boundaries and raise issues of State responsibility under the 
24 See Chapter 2.V.ii about the principle of subsidiarity.
25 See Chapter 3.III.ii.&iii.
26 “Plenary Court” means the European Court of Human Rights sitting in plenary session (Rule 1 of the Court).
27 See Chapter 3.II.i.
28 For an outline of the admissibility criteria see Chapter 3.II.i.
29 See the leading judgment Belilos v. Switzerland, judgment of 29 April 1988, no. 10328/83, paras. 50-60. For a 
recent recapitulation and application of the relevant principles see, for example, Schädler-Eberle v. Liechten-
stein, judgment 18 July 2013, no. 56422/09, paras. 59-93.
30 For the autonomous concept of “victim” see Chapter 2.VI.i.
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Convention: (i) circumstances of “State agent authority and control”, where the State, 
through its agents that operate outside its territory, exercises control and authority 
over an individual, and (ii) “effective control over an area”31.
Competence ratione temporis: the Court will not examine applications re-
garding complaints in relation to any act or fact which took place, or any situation 
which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the Convention with re-
spect to the respondent State (the “critical date”). The Court needs to identify, in each 
specific case, the exact time of the alleged interference, taking into account both the 
facts of which the applicant complains and the scope of the Convention right alleged 
to have been violated (Blečić v. Croatia32). The Court may have regard to the facts 
prior to ratification inasmuch as they could be considered to have created a contin-
uous situation extending beyond that date or may be relevant for the understanding 
of facts occurring after that date (e.g. Kurić and Others v. Slovenia33). The procedural 
obligations arising under Articles 2 and 3 in particular have been found to be “de-
tachable” from the substantive aspects of these rights; thus, in cases where deaths or 
illegal treatment occurred before ratification, the State may have a distinct procedural 
obligation in relation to these acts (to conduct an effective investigation and institute 
appropriate proceedings) that arose after the critical date. Accordingly, the Court can 
assume temporal jurisdiction in such cases.34
• Articles 36 - 40 concern procedural issues related to 3rd party interven-
tions, the Court’s power to strike out applications, the examination of the 
case, friendly settlements, and the public character of the hearings and the 
documents submitted to the Registrar.
31 See Al-Skeini and Others v. the United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 7 July 2011, no. 55721/07, pa-
ras. 130-150, where the Court examines its previous case-law regarding its jurisdiction under Article 1, clarifies 
the principles applicable on the matter and exemplifies the above two categories of exceptional circumstances.
32 Blečić v. Croatia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 8 March 2006, no. 59532/00, para. 82.
33 See, for example, Kurić and Others v. Slovenia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 26 June 2012, no. 26828/06, para. 
240. The Court concluded that, although the erasure had happened before the Convention’s entry into force in 
respect of Slovenia, on that date the applicants were - as they continued to be - affected by the fact that their 
names were erased from the register.
34 See Šilih v. Slovenia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 9 April 2009, no. 71463/01, paras. 139-167. The case con-
cerned the procedural limb of Article 2 and established its “detachable” character. The Court set two criteria, 
stating that the Court’s temporal jurisdiction will extend only to the procedural acts or omissions in the period 
subsequent to the critical date and that there must “exist a genuine connection between the death and the entry 
into force of the Convention in respect of the respondent State (paras. 162-163). These criteria were later clarified 
in the case of Janowiec and Others v. Russia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 21 October 2013, nos. 55508/07 and 
29520/09, paras. 140-151. 
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• Articles 41 - 49 concern remedies for the injured party (just satisfaction - 
Article 41), the decisional instruments of the Court (decisions, judgments 
and advisory opinions), including their content and the conditions under 
which Chambers’ judgments become final, and the binding force and ex-
ecution of final judgments (Article 46). All these issues are examined in 
Chapter 3.
• Articles 50 - 51 relate to the Court’s expenditure, borne by the Council of 
Europe, and the privileges and immunities to which the judges are entitled.
Important note: It is evident Section II of the Convention contains Articles 
concerning the function of the Court and certain procedural issues before it. Howev-
er, some of these Articles do contain substantive rights that individuals may rely on. 
For example, the Court has held that under Article 34 the Contracting States have the 
obligation not to interfere with an individual’s effective exercise of the right to submit 
and pursue a complaint before the Court (Paladi v. Moldova35). Also, the Court has 
held that it is competent to examine complaints related to the non-execution of a 
particular judgment where there are facts that give rise to a fresh violation (e.g. Emre 
v. Switzerland (No 2)36)37.
Section III: Miscellaneous provisions
Section III of the Convention comprises Articles 52-59 which contain mis-
cellaneous provisions. These concern inquiries made by the Secretary General (Ar-
ticle 52), the relation of the Convention with other instruments that provide human 
rights protection (Article 53)38, non-interference with the powers of the Committee 
of Ministers as these are set out by the Statute of the Council of Europe (Article 54), 
the exclusion of other means of dispute settlement (Article 55), the Convention’s ter-
ritorial application (Article 56)39, States’ reservations in terms of particular provisions 
(Article 57), the denunciation of the Convention (Article 58), and its signature and 
ratification (Article 59).
35 Paladi v. Moldova, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 10 March 2009, no. 39806/05, para. 85.
36 Emre v. Switzerland (No 2), judgment of 11 October 2011, no. 5056/10, para. 39, also citing Verein gegen Tier-
fabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (No 2), [Grand Chamber] judgment of 30 June 2009, no. 32772/02, paras. 
66-67.
37 See Chapter 3.III.iii about the role of the Court after deliverance of a final judgment. 
38 See Chapter 2.V.iii.
39 See above under Article 1 and the competence ratione loci.
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Chapter 2
Key European Convention concepts
and principles
This chapter is dedicated to the key concepts and principles that un-derpin the Convention and is intended to be used as a practical tool when reading and implementing the jurisprudence of the Court. Some 
of the key concepts are clear from the text of the Convention; others are not expressly 
articulated in the text, but have been read into it by the Court when applying the 
Convention.
Whilst some of the concepts may at first glance look familiar, the Strasbourg 
organs have also ruled that certain terms have an “autonomous” meaning under the 
Convention. These terms may therefore NOT have the same meaning as they do in 
national law.
This chapter is divided into 7 sections:
• Categories of rights
• Prohibition of discrimination
• The balancing of rights 
• Proportionality 
• The Convention’s relationship with national and international law
• Autonomous concepts
• Positive obligations
I. CATEGORIES OF RIGHTS
The Convention embraces four broad classes of rights: absolute rights; substan-
tially qualified rights; rights relating to the administration of justice; rights with inherent 
restrictions.
1. Absolute rights
Infringements of these rights are not permitted in any circumstances.  They 
include the right to life (Article 2), prohibition of torture (Article 3), prohibition 
of slavery and forced labour (Article 4 § 1), no punishment without law (Article 7), 
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abolition of the death penalty (Article 1 of Protocol 6 and Article 1 of Protocol 
13)40, and the right not to be tried or punished twice (Article 4 of Protocol 7).
Article 15 of the Convention permits derogations in time of emergency, but 
makes it clear that no derogation from Articles 2, 3, 4 § 1, 7, or from Article 1 of Protocol 
6, Article 4 of Protocol 7 and Article 1 of Protocol 13 can be made under that provision.
Article 2 § 1 (right to life) – following the coming into force of Protocol 6 in 
1985 and Protocol 13 in 2003, abolishing the death penalty, this Article should now 
read as though the second sentence stopped at the word “intentionally”. 
Intentional deprivation of life is not permitted in any circumstances.
In deciding whether the deprivation of life has met the criteria set out in Article 
2 § 2, the Court has taken a very strict approach to the phrase “no more than absolute-
ly necessary”, and has in particular been careful to examine what alternatives to the 
use of lethal force were available.
A violation of Article 2 may be found even when no death occurs (e.g. Makaratzis 
v. Greece41; Saso Gorgiev v. Macedonia42) or in cases of forced disappearance where the 
body has not been found. Disappearance cases may also trigger Article 5, as well as Ar-
ticle 3 as regards the impact of the disappearance on the relatives (e.g. Taş v. Turkey43).
Article 3 (prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment or 
punishment) is short and simple. Any treatment which passes the very high “thresh-
old of severity” test is prohibited44. Whether or not it reaches that threshold will de-
pend on all the circumstances of the case (see inter alia Muršić v. Croatia45), such as 
the duration of the treatment, physical or mental effects, and the sex, age and state 
40 In contrast to Protocol 6, Protocol 13 prohibits death penalty even in time of war, but not all countries have rati-
fied it; all Balkan countries have, however, ratified it.
41 Makaratzis v. Greece, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 20 December 2004, no. 50385/99, para. 49.
42 Saso Gorgiev v. Macedonia, judgment of 19 April 2012, no. 49382/06, para. 29.
43 Taş v. Turkey, judgment of 14 November 2000, no. 24396/94, paras. 79-80.
44 For an example of degrading treatment passing such test, see Bouyid v. Belgium, judgment [Grand Chamber] of 
28 September 2015, no. 23380/09, paras. 86-88 and 100-113; the Court found that the administration of slaps by 
police officers to a person who is completely under their control constitutes a serious attack on their dignity and 
constitutes degrading treatment.
45 Muršić v. Croatia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 20 October 2016, no. 7334/13, where the Court recapitulated 
the principles and standards for the assessment of whether insufficient personal space allocated to prisoners 
passes the “threshold of severity” test of Article 3 (paras. 96-141).
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of health of the victim (Ireland v. the United Kingdom46), as well as the nature and 
context of the treatment or punishment, and the manner and method of its execution 
(Soering v. the United Kingdom47).
For political reasons - it appears more unacceptable to a State to be found guilty 
of torture than inhuman treatment - some of the case law has devoted considerable 
time and intellectual energy to deciding whether the treatment in question should 
be classified as torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment48. But all 
are equally absolutely prohibited, whether administered by state officials or private 
individuals, or in situations where an individual will be exposed to such treatment if 
sent to another jurisdiction in expulsion or extradition proceedings. The same applies 
to Article 2 when the death penalty will be imposed on an individual if sent to another 
jurisdiction in expulsion or extradition proceedings or where a real risk of deliberate 
killing exists against such individual.
Both Article 2 and Article 3 have inherent procedural safeguards as well as 
substantive elements and require that any police or military operation is prudently 
planned and any allegations of unlawful killing or treatment prohibited by Article 3, 
committed either by State officials or by private persons, are properly investigated. 
The investigation must be effective, that is, capable of establishing the facts and iden-
tifying and punishing those responsible. The investigation must be both prompt and 
thorough, which means that the authorities must act of their own motion once the 
matter has come to their attention and must always make a serious attempt to find out 
what happened, including taking all reasonable steps available to them to secure the 
relevant evidence. Furthermore, the investigation should be independent of the exec-
utive, whereas the victim should be able to participate effectively in the investigation 
in one form or another.49 
In a series of cases concerning extraordinary renditions, the Court has ac-
knowledged that an aspect of the procedural limb of Article 3 also concerns the right 
to the truth regarding the relevant circumstances of the case, which “does not belong 
solely to the victim of the crime and his or her family but also to other victims of 
similar violations and the general public, who have the right to know what has hap-
pened”50; this constitutes another reason why the State must undertake an adequate 
46 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71, para. 162.
47 Soering v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 1989, no. 14038/88 para. 100.
48 For the meaning of each of these concepts see below section VI.i.
49 For a reiteration of the principles mentioned above, including references to the Court’s case law, see, inter alia, 
El-Masri v. Macedonia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 13 December 2012, no. 39630/09, paras. 182-185.
50 Al Nashiri v. Poland, judgment of 24 July 2014, no. 28761/11, para. 495.
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investigation in order to prevent any appearance of impunity in respect of such acts 
(see El-Masri v. Macedonia51).
The principles regarding the requirement of an effective investigation that have 
been developed under Articles 2 and 3 also apply to other breaches of substantive 
rights, notably Articles 4, 5 and 8.
Article 4 (prohibition of slavery and forced labour) has little case law. Only 
Article 4 § 1 (“No one shall be held in slavery or servitude”) is absolute.
Human trafficking and agricultural or domestic servitude fall within the scope 
of Article 4 (see Siliadin v. France52, as well as Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia53, where 
the Court first clarified the States’ positive obligations under this Article while also 
taking into consideration the cross-border feature of trafficking cases54, and the relat-
ed M and others v. Italy and Bulgaria55, where no violation of Article 4 was, however, 
found. See also, the judgment in Chowdury and Others v. Greece56 regarding the rights 
of undocumented workers). As is the case with Articles 2 and 3, Article 4 also imposes 
a procedural obligation on the State to investigate any credible suspicion of a violation 
of this Article.
Article 7 (no punishment without law) – Article 7 has been interpreted to 
guarantee that “where there are differences between the criminal law in force at the 
time of the commission of the offence and subsequent criminal laws enacted before a 
final judgment is rendered, the courts must apply the law whose provisions are most 
favourable to the defendant” (Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2)57).
51 El-Masri v. Macedonia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 13 December 2012, no. 39630/09, paras. 191-192.
52 Siliadin v. France, judgment of 26 July 2005, no. 73316/01.
53 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010, no. 25965/04.
54 The Court found that Cyprus had failed to put in place an appropriate legislative and administrative frame-
work against trafficking (namely, the regime of artiste visas in Cyprus had not afforded to the trafficked person 
practical and effective protection) whereas the police had failed to protect the person from trafficking although 
the circumstances gave rise to a credible suspicion that she might have been trafficked or exploited. On its part, 
Russia, which was where the recruitment had occurred, had violated the procedural obligation under Article 4 to 
conduct an effective investigation into the person’s recruitment (id. paras. 290-309).
55 M and others v. Italy and Bulgaria, judgment of 31 July 2012, no. 40020/03
56 Chowdury and Others v. Greece, judgment of 30 March 2017, no. 21884/15.
57 Scoppola v. Italy (No. 2), [Grand Chamber] judgment of 17 September 2009, no. 10249/03, para. 109.
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Although Article 7 is an absolute right, the Court has held that it does not 
preclude clarification and development through the common law, consistent with the 
essence of the offence and where the development of the law is reasonably foreseeable. 
The locus classicus was the jurisprudential criminalisation of rape in marriage (S.W. v. 
the United Kingdom58). The Court has used the same criteria that it uses when it needs 
to determine whether an interference with Articles 8-11 is sufficiently prescribed in 
law (see below).
2. Substantially qualified rights
These rights may be interfered with but only when there is a legitimate aim 
identified in the Articles and the interference is proportionate to that specific aim. 
These are: right to respect for family and private life, home and correspondence (Ar-
ticle 8), right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Article 9), freedom of 
expression (Article 10), freedom of assembly and association (Article 11).
In considering whether there has been a violation of these rights, the Stras-
bourg organs have asked the following questions:
1. Do the facts disclose an identified protected right as that right has been 
defined by the Court?
2. Has there been an interference with the protected right, or is such an inter-
ference proposed?
3. Was/is that interference prescribed by a law meeting the quality of law test?59
4. Did/would the interference pursue an identified legitimate aim? Here, check 
the aims permitted by each Convention Article.
5. Was the interference necessary in a democratic society as proportionate to 
the legitimate aim pursued? Or, will it be?60
If the answers to questions 1 and 2 are YES, but the answer to any (or a fortiori 
all) of questions 3, 4, 5 is NO, there will have been a violation.
3. Rights relating to the administration of justice
These are: the right to liberty and security (Article 5), the right to a fair trial 
(Article 6), no punishment without law (Article 7)61, the right of appeal in criminal 
58 S.W. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 22 November 1995, no. 20166/92, paras. 36 and 41-43.
59 For the Convention meaning of the “quality of law” see below Section VI.ii.
60 For the principle of proportionality also see below in Section IV.
61 A brief comment on Article 7 has been included above in the section regarding absolute rights.
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matters (Article 2 of Protocol 7), and the right not to be tried or punished twice 
(Article 4 of Protocol 7).
Article 5 (right to liberty and security) - the key principle underlying this Ar-
ticle is the observance of the rule of law. The list of instances of lawful deprivation of 
liberty set out in Article 5 § 1 is exhaustive. Detention will be unlawful unless it is 
for one of the specified reasons and clearly authorised by an identifiable provision of 
national law.
Article 5 § 4 affords the arrested or detained person the right to have the lawful-
ness of the deprivation of liberty reviewed speedily by a court that has the competence 
to order release if the detention is unlawful. The review does not extend to all aspects 
of the case but it should be wide enough to cover the procedural and substantive con-
ditions that are essential for the “lawfulness”, in Convention terms, of the deprivation 
of liberty. This includes examining “compliance with the procedural requirements of 
domestic law as well the reasonableness of the suspicion underpinning the arrest and 
the legitimacy of the purpose pursued by the arrest and the ensuing detention”62.
Article 5 § 5 (compensation for victims of unlawful arrest or detention) and 
Article 3 Protocol 7 (compensation for wrongful conviction) are the only places 
where the Convention stipulates that national law must provide compensation.  
Article 6 (right to a fair trial) - this right only applies to the determination of 
civil rights and/or criminal charges as those concepts have been elaborated on by the 
Court (see below at section VI.i.). It does not apply automatically to all court pro-
ceedings concerning other Convention rights. It includes the right of access to court 
and sets out the safeguards which will ensure a fair trial. The rights are not absolute. 
Access to court, for example, may be restricted by procedural bars or limitation pe-
riods. Any limitations must not, however, restrict or reduce a person’s access to such 
an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired (see, for example, Marini v. 
Albania63). The right to legal aid (as opposed to legal representation) is only guaran-
teed in both civil and criminal proceedings where the “interests of justice so require”. 
Denial of access to legal representation in criminal proceedings requires a much more 
62 For a recent reiteration of the principles regarding Article 5(4), see Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, [Grand Cham-
ber] judgment of 15 December 2016, no. 16483/12, paras. 128-131.
63 Marini v. Albania, judgment of 18 December 2007, no. 3738/02, paras. 113 & 122. The Court held that the right 
to court includes the right to have a final determination on a matter submitted to a court (para. 120); the Consti-
tutional Court’s failure to reach a majority on the proposals before it restricted the essence of the applicant’s right 
under Article 6(1).
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stringent test (see Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom64). Denial of access to a 
lawyer of the defendant’s own choosing may also amount to a violation of the right to 
a fair hearing, when such restriction is made without “relevant and sufficient” reasons 
and affects the overall fairness of the proceedings (Dvorski v. Croatia65).
A word of warning must be given about Article 6 case law. Since - by definition 
- no complaint will be admissible in Strasbourg unless all domestic remedies have 
been exhausted, almost all cases alleging violations of Article 6 will have proceeded to 
the highest national courts before reaching Strasbourg. The Court will frequently find 
no violation of Article 6 because it considers that the proceedings “taken as a whole” 
were fair and that the higher court was able to rectify the errors of the lower courts. 
Judges sitting in lower courts may hence erroneously be persuaded that because a 
particular procedural defect was not found to be a violation of the Convention by the 
Strasbourg organs, it complies with Convention standards.
Article 2 of Protocol 7 (right of appeal in criminal matters) - This guarantees 
a right to have a criminal conviction or sentence “reviewed” by a higher tribunal. The 
Article does not guarantee a right to an appeal on the merits of a judgment and the 
States have a wide margin of appreciation to determine how it is to be exercised - any 
limitations though must pursue a legitimate aim and not infringe the very essence of 
the right. The review may therefore concern both points of fact and points of law or 
be confined solely to points of law (Krombach v. France66). The term “tribunal” has the 
same autonomous meaning as in Article 6(1) (see below in section VI.i.).
Article 4 of Protocol 7 (right not to be tried or punished twice) - The Article 
contains three distinct guarantees: no one shall be (i) liable to be tried, (ii) tried or 
(iii) punished in criminal proceedings for the same offence, irrespective of whether 
the proceedings have resulted in a conviction or acquittal. It applies to judgments that 
are final, that is, those that have acquired the force of res judicata. 
For the determination of whether the proceedings in question can be regarded 
as “criminal” in the context of this Article, the Court applies the three Engel criteria 
previously developed for the purposes of Article 6 (see below in part VI.i. under the 
concept “criminal”). What constitutes a different “offence” is not to be determined by 
the legal characterisation of the offences in question; it would be the same offence in 
64 Ibrahim and Others v. the United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 13 September 2016, nos. 50541/08 
and others, paras. 255-265, where the Court clarified the principles applicable to the test of the two stages assess-
ment previously laid down in Salduz v. Turkey, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 27 November 2008, no. 36391/02.
65 Dvorski v. Croatia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 20 October 2015, no. 25703/11, paras.79-80.
66 Krombach v. France, judgment of 13 February 2001, no. 29731/96, para. 96.
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so far as it arises from identical facts or facts which are substantially the same (see 
Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia67, where the Court harmonised its previous approaches 
primarily on the matter of what constitutes idem in the ne bis in idem principle laid 
down in this Article68). In A and B v. Norway69, the Court examined its previous case 
law predominantly on the issue of what constitutes bis in the above principle, that is, 
on the question of whether the proceedings have been duplicated. It concluded that 
Article 4 of Protocol 7 does not preclude the conduct of parallel proceedings, which 
are aimed to address different aspects of the social problem involved (for example, im-
position through administrative proceedings of tax penalties and criminal persecu-
tion for fraud because of tax evasion, which was the issue in this case). The respondent 
State must, however, demonstrate that the dual proceedings in question have been 
“sufficiently closely connected in substance and in time”, having been combined in a 
foreseeable and proportionate manner so as to form a coherent whole70.
Paragraph 2 of this Article provides for the possibility that a case is re-opened 
in accordance with domestic law following the emergence of new evidence or the 
discovery of a fundamental defect in the previous proceedings. In Marguš v. Croatia71 
the Court held that granting amnesty to a soldier for acts amounting to grave breaches 
of fundamental human rights amounted to a “fundamental defect” in the previous set 
of proceedings; Article 4 of Protocol 7 did not therefore apply in the specific circum-
stances of the case.
4. Rights with inherent restrictions
These rights do not include a specific provision permitting interferences, as is 
found in the substantially qualified rights, but the Court has accepted that there is 
room for implied restrictions. These rights are: the right to marry (Article 12), right 
to peaceful enjoyment of possessions (Article 1 of Protocol 1), right to education 
(Article 2 of Protocol 1) and right to free elections (Article 3 of Protocol 1).
Article 12 (right to marry) – the wording suggests that any interference is ac-
ceptable if it is prescribed by national law, but the Convention organs have held that 
it must not “impair the very essence of the right”. The scope of the right to marry is 
examined below in the section regarding the autonomous concepts (section VI).
67 Sergey Zolotukhin v. Russia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 10 February 2009, no. 14939/03.
68 Id. paras. 78-84.
69 A and B v. Norway, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 15 November 2016, nos. 24130/11 and 29758/11.
70 Id. paras. 130 – 134, where the Court explains the factors that determine whether the proceedings are sufficiently 
closely connected.
71 Marguš v. Croatia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 27 May 2014, no. 4455/10, para. 124-141.
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Article 1 Protocol 1 (peaceful enjoyment of possessions72) - The Article com-
prises three distinct but connected rules (see, inter alia, Sporrong and Lonnroth v. 
Sweden73; Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia 
and Macedonia74): the general principle of peaceful enjoyment of possessions and two 
rules concerning particular instances of interference with the right to peaceful enjoy-
ment of property (deprivation of possessions and control on the use of property). The 
structure of the Article and the interconnection of its three rules have informed the 
Court’s approach when examining a complaint under any of the rules of this Article 
(see for example The Holy Monasteries v. Greece75; Broniowski v. Poland76; Chassa-
gnou and Others v. France77). Accordingly, any type of interference with the peaceful 
enjoyment of possessions needs to fulfil the following principles: (i) the principle of 
lawfulness – the interference must be provided for by “law” in the meaning of the 
Convention; (ii) the interference must pursue a legitimate aim “in the public interest” 
or “in the general interest”. The national authorities enjoy a wide margin of apprecia-
tion as they have direct knowledge of their society and its needs when implementing 
social and economic policies; as a result, the Court’s examination is limited to review-
ing whether the national authorities’ judgment as to what is “in the public interest” 
has been manifestly without reasonable foundation. (iii) There must be a fair balance 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements 
of the protection of the individual’s right to peacefully enjoy their possessions.
Article 2 Protocol 1 (right to education) - This Article guarantees a right of 
access to educational institutions existing at a given time. It imposes on States the 
obligation to provide effective access to such establishments, which means, inter alia, 
that the individual who is the beneficiary should have the possibility of drawing profit 
from the education received (Belgian linguistic case78). Seen in conjunction with Arti-
cle 14, there may be some positive obligations for the State (for example, in Oršuš and 
Others v. Croatia79 the Court observed that a high drop-out rate of Roma pupils at a 
particular County in Croatia called for the implementation of positive measures). All 
72 See below in Section VI.i. about the concept of “possessions”.
73 Sporrong and Lonnroth v. Sweden, judgment of 23 September 1982, nos. 7151/75 and 7152/75, para. 61.
74 Ališić and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Serbia, Slovenia and the Macedonia, judgment [Grand 
Chamber] of 16 July 2014, no. 60642/08, para. 98.
75 The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, judgment of 09 December 1994, nos. 13092/87 and 13984/88, para. 56.
76 Broniowski v. Poland, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 22 June 2004, no. 31443/96, para. 134.
77 Chassagnou and Others v. France, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 29 April 1999, nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 
28443/95, para. 75.
78 Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium, “Belgian linguistic 
case”, judgment of 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64.
79 Oršuš and Others v. Croatia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 16 March 2010, no. 15766/03, para. 177.
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levels of education are covered but there is a wider margin of appreciation recognised 
as we move from primary to higher education (Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria80).
Article 3 Protocol 1 (right to free elections) - In determining compliance of 
a State’s interference with this right, the Court has focused mainly on two criteria: 
whether there has been arbitrariness or a lack of proportionality, and whether the 
restriction has interfered with the free expression of the opinion of the people. The 
Article contains an active aspect (right to vote) and a passive one (right to stand for 
election). The Court follows a stricter approach when it examines restrictions on the 
right to vote rather than on the right to stand for election where a wider margin of 
appreciation seems to be afforded to the States (Zdanoka v. Latvia81).
II. PROHIBITION OF DISCRIMINATION
There is no freestanding prohibition on discrimination in the main body of 
the ECHR. Article 14 (prohibition of discrimination) does not provide for a general 
prohibition, but only for a prohibition of discrimination in respect of the rights guar-
anteed in the Convention. The Court has in fact stated that it is as though Article 14 
formed an integral part of each of the Articles laying down rights and freedoms (Bel-
gian Linguistic case82). However there can be a violation of Article 14 even if there is 
no violation of the substantive right as long as the subject matter falls within the ambit 
of the substantive right (see for example Kafkaris v. Cyprus83; Thlimmenos v. Greece84; 
Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina85; and Burden v. the United Kingdom86).
Article 1 of Protocol 12 provides a wider prohibition on discrimination in 
relation to any right “set forth in law”. It came into force in April 200587. However, 
Protocol 12 still does not prohibit all forms of discrimination but only in relation to 
rights “set forth in [national] law”.
80 Ponomaryovi v. Bulgaria, judgment of 21 June 2011, no. 5335/05, para. 56.
81 Zdanoka v. Latvia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 16 March 2006, no. 58278/00, para. 115.
82 Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium, “Belgian linguistic 
case”, judgment of 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64.
83 Kafkaris v. Cyprus, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 12 February 2008, no. 21906/04, para. 159.
84 Thlimmenos v. Greece, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 6 April 2000, no. 34369/97, para. 40.
85 Sejdic and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 22 December 2009, nos. 27996/06 
and 34836/06, para. 39.
86 Burden v. the United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 29 April 2008, no. 13378/05, para. 58.
87 In Montenegro, Protocol 12 came into force on 6 June 2006.
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The Court follows the same definition of discrimination for both Articles: dis-
crimination means treating differently persons in similar situations without an objec-
tive and reasonable justification. “No objective and reasonable justification” means 
that the differentiation in treatment does not pursue a legitimate aim or that it is not 
proportionate.
In determining whether or not Article 14 has been violated the Court asks:
1. Is there a difference in treatment? (like must be compared with like)
2. Is it based on the characteristic identified? (sex, race, colour, language, reli-
gion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a 
national minority, property, birth or other status)
3. Does it have a legitimate aim? (not every difference in treatment amounts to 
discrimination) 
4. Is the difference in treatment proportionate?
The Court has not only found that like should be treated alike, but that dis-
crimination occurs in situations where people who should be treated differently are 
treated the same without an objective and reasonable justification (e.g. Thlimmenos 
v. Greece88).
The Court has also considered that discrimination contrary to the Conven-
tion may result not only from a legislative measure, but also from a de facto situation 
resulting from a well-established practice (e.g. Zarb Adami v. Malta89).
A person can be a victim of discrimination on the basis of another persons’ 
protected status or characteristics (see, for example, Škorjanec v. Croatia90, where the 
applicant had been targeted as the partner of a man of Roma origin, and Guberina v. 
Croatia91, in which case the applicant had suffered less favourable treatment by the tax 
authorities on grounds relating to the disability of his child).
III. THE BALANCING OF RIGHTS 
 Under Article 1, States are under a positive obligation, to provide effective 
protection for each individual’s right to life, to physical safety and to the peaceful en-
joyment of his or her possessions, and to take all the steps that they could reasonably 
88 Thlimmenos v. Greece, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 6 April 2000, no. 34369/97, para. 44.
89 Zarb Adami v. Malta, judgment of 20 June 2006, no. 17209/02, para. 76.
90 Škorjanec v. Croatia, judgment of 28 March 2017, no. 25536/14, paras. 55-56.
91 Guberina v. Croatia, judgment of 22 March 2016, no. 23682/13, paras. 76-79.
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be expected to take to prevent the occurrence of a harm of which they knew or ought 
to have known. If the harm has occurred, they have a duty to investigate it effectively, 
prosecute it correctly, and hold a fair trial which is capable of leading to a conviction 
if the accused is guilty.
This obligation dictates the balance that has to be achieved between the rights 
of victims and the rights of the accused in the good administration of justice, in par-
ticular criminal justice, which is regulated by Articles 5 and 6.
In many situations the balancing act that has to be carried out will be between 
the Convention rights of two or more potential human rights victims, as often occurs 
in family law or landlord-tenant disputes. Under Articles 8-11, it may be that the 
Convention right, e.g. right to privacy, or to a good reputation under Article 8, of one 
person has to be balanced against the Convention right to freedom of expression un-
der Article 10 of another (e.g. Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2)92 and Axel Springer 
AG v. Germany93). Sometimes it is the interests of the community as a whole which 
have to be balanced against the rights of an individual - compulsory purchase orders 
are a classic example.
Where domestic courts have undertaken a balancing act between two rights 
in conformity with the criteria laid down in the Court’s case-law, the Court would 
require strong reasons to set aside the balancing done by them (e.g. Medžlis Islamske 
Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina94).
Articles 17 and 18 set out some general principles in this context.
Article 17 is applicable only on an exceptional basis and in extreme cases (Pak-
sas v. Lithuania95; Perinçek v. Switzerland96). The Article’s general purpose, insofar as 
it refers to groups or to individuals, is to prevent those with totalitarian aims from tak-
ing advantage of the provisions of the Convention in order to engage in any activity 
or perform any act aimed at destroying any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
92 See Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2),  [Grand Chamber] judgment of 7 February 2012, nos. 40660/08 and 
60641/08.
93 Axel Springer AG v. Germany, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 7 February 2012, no. 39954/08.
94 Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [Grand Chamber] judgment of 27 
June 2017, no. 17224/11, para. 121, with reference to Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2),  [Grand Chamber] 
judgment of 7 February 2012, nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08.
95 Paksas v. Lithuania, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 06 November 2011, no. 34932/04, paras. 87-88.
96 Perinçek v. Switzerland, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 15 October 2015, no. 27510/08, para. 114.
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Convention (see Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3)97). As a result, Article 17 is applicable only 
to rights that allow a person to engage in such activities, such as Articles 9, 10 and 11. 
It cannot, therefore, be the basis for depriving a person of other fundamental rights, 
such as for example those guaranteed by Articles 5 and 6 (Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3)98).
Notable examples of cases examined under Article 17 include cases related to 
the rights of communist parties (German Communist Party v. the Federal Republic 
of Germany; United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey99) and to poten-
tial limitations to the freedom of expression in cases concerning statements denying 
the Holocaust, justifying a pro-Nazi policy, alleging the prosecution of Poles by the 
Jewish minority and the existence of inequality between them, or linking all Muslims 
with a grave act of terrorism (Pavel Ivanov v. Russia100 with references to such cases).
Article 18 does not have an autonomous role and it can only be applied in 
conjunction with other Articles of the Convention. However, there can be a breach of 
Article 18 even if there is no breach of the Article in conjunction with which it applies. 
A central issue regarding the application of this Article relates to the difficulty in prov-
ing an improper aim behind the actions of an authority. The Court used to begin its 
assessment starting from the general assumption that the national authorities of the 
States have acted in good faith; the applicant was expected to convincingly rebut this 
assumption. As a result, there have not been many cases where a breach of that Arti-
cle has been found (e.g. Gusinskiy v. Russia101; Lutsenko v. Ukraine102; Tymoshenko v. 
Ukraine103). However, the Court has recently revisited its case law in Merabishvili v. 
Georgia104, clarifying that there is no reason to restrict itself to direct proof in relation 
to complaints under Article 18 or to apply a special standard of proof to such allega-
tions105. As a general rule, the burden of proof is not borne by one or the other party, 
and this approach also applies to complaints under Article 18106.
97 Lawless v. Ireland (No. 3), judgment of 1 July 1961, no. 332/57, p. 18, para. 7.
98 Ibid.
99 German Communist Party v. the Federal Republic of Germany, decision of 20 July 1957, no. 250/57; United 
Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 30 January 1998, no. 19392/92.
100 Pavel Ivanov v. Russia, decision of 20 February 2007, no. 35222/04, p. 4.
101 Gusinskiy v. Russia, judgment of 19 May 2004, no. 70276/01, paras. 73-78. 
102 Lutsenko v. Ukraine, judgment of 3 July 2012, no. 6492/11, paras. 104-110.
103 Tymoshenko v. Ukraine, judgment of 30 April 2013, no. 49872/11, paras. 294-301.
104 Merabishvili v. Georgia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 28 November 2017, no. 72508/13.
105 Id. para. 316.
106 Id. paras. 310-311.
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IV. PROPORTIONALITY
There are several invisible provisions of the Convention - concepts and rights 
which are not to be found expressly anywhere in the wording of the text but which 
have become over the years an integral part of Convention law. Of these, proportion-
ality is the most significant and is at the heart of all justification for interferences with 
Convention rights.
There are a number of key tests which can be applied to any Convention 
question:
1. Have “relevant and sufficient reasons” been advanced for any interference 
with a Convention right? Is it “necessary in a democratic society”? Does it 
correspond to a “pressing social need”?
2. Is there an alternative action which would have interfered less? Has it been 
considered? Have relevant and sufficient reasons been given for rejecting it?
3. Were procedural safeguards both in place and observed so as to avoid the 
possibility of abuse?
4. Does the interference operate so as to “impair the very essence of the right”?
V. THE CONVENTION’S RELATIONSHIP WITH NATIONAL 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
i. Subsidiarity
An express reference to the principle of subsidiarity will be introduced into 
the Preamble of the Convention once Protocol 15 enters into force107. Nonetheless, it 
has long been considered as a principle deeply embedded in the Convention and the 
Court has been referring to it since its early case law (for the first time in the Belgian 
linguistic case108). The principle of subsidiarity embodies the shared responsibility of 
the States and the Court for realising the effective implementation of the Conven-
tion109. Accordingly, it has a two-sided nature. On the one hand, the States are re-
sponsible for securing the rights and the freedoms guaranteed by the Convention 
and for providing effective remedies when necessary. This obligation falls on all na-
tional authorities, including domestic courts. On the other hand, the Court cannot 
assume the role of the competent national authorities in doing so and must therefore 
107 Protocol 15 was adopted on 24 June 2013; it will enter into force once all member States ratify it.
108 Case relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium, “Belgian linguistic 
case”, judgment of 23 July 1968, nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1691/62, 1769/63, 1994/63 and 2126/64.
109 See the 2012 Brighton Declaration.
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recognise a margin of appreciation enabling them to choose the appropriate mea-
sures. Its obligation is to supervise the conformity of these measures with the require-
ments of the Convention. As regards the domestic courts’ decisions in particular, the 
Court has repeatedly said that it is not a fourth-instance court and it cannot take the 
place of the national courts, which are first and foremost responsible to assess the facts 
of a case and the applicable law; it will only move on to make such an assessment itself 
when this is required to ensure that the decisions in question are not in themselves in 
breach of the Convention.
ii. The margin of appreciation
The doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” is a creature of international law. 
It defines the relationship between a supranational court - the European Court of 
Human Rights - and national courts. Under the Convention, States are free to adopt 
whatever means they choose to protect Convention rights, subject to the eventual 
supervision of the Convention organs. The Convention does not demand the same 
standards to be applied uniformly throughout the 47 Member States of the Council 
of Europe with their widely different social, cultural, economic and legal systems. In 
this respect, Convention law is very different from European Union law which does 
demand a very high degree of uniformity. So long as the States have “secured” the 
protected rights, as required by Article 1, they have a margin of appreciation as to how 
they do so. Whether this margin is wide or narrow will depend on the right involved 
and the circumstances of the case. As is the case with the principle of subsidiarity, the 
doctrine of the margin of appreciation has been “invisible” but will be introduced into 
the preamble to the Convention once Protocol 15 enters into force110.
iii. Article 53 (Safeguard for existing human rights)
Article 53 is another manifestation of the principle of subsidiarity in that it 
recognises that States may provide additional protection for human rights, with the 
Convention being the absolute minimum. Additional protection may be afforded ei-
ther via the domestic legislation or via international agreements to which each State 
may be a party, particularly those that are more thematic. Indicatively, these may be: 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child; the Council of Europe Convention on 
Action against Trafficking in Human Beings; the 1951 Refugee Convention; the Con-
vention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, EU law, and the UN human rights 
instruments. The Court has long referred to such international instruments, when 
interpreting the Convention.
110 Supra note 107.
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VI. AUTONOMOUS CONCEPTS
The European Commission and Court of Human Rights have adopted a particu-
lar “Convention meaning” for a number of phrases – a meaning which is often different 
from that found both in national law and in layman’s speech. This approach is justified 
by the need to secure a degree of uniformity of treatment in the contracting parties as 
well as to ensure that States do not use their own definitions to circumvent the rights 
and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention. Since its first judgments on the issue of the 
autonomous meaning of certain phrases (Engel v. Netherlands111 & König v. Germany112), 
the Court has highlighted on numerous occasions that the definitions under domestic 
law serve as just a starting point. Hence, when using Convention provisions and case 
law, it is important to be familiar with these autonomous concepts and their definitions.
i. Definition of terms used in the Convention text113
Torture (Article 3)
This involves suffering of a particular intensity and cruelty, attaching a “spe-
cial stigma to deliberate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering” 
(Ireland v. the United Kingdom the United Kingdom114). Suffering can be physical or 
mental provided that it is sufficiently serious (the Greek Interstate case115).
Inhuman treatment (Article 3)
Covers at least such treatment as deliberately causes severe mental and physi-
cal suffering (See Greek Interstate case116). The ill-treatment “must attain a minimum 
level of severity” if it is to amount to inhuman treatment (Ireland v. the United King-
domthe United Kingdom117). In contrast with torture, intention to cause suffering is 
not necessary, nor is there a requirement that the suffering is purposeful. A further 
distinction between torture and inhuman treatment lies in the degree of suffering. In 
111 Engel v. Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, nos. 5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, and 5370/72, para. 81.
112 König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, no. 6232/73, paraS. 88-90.
113 Note that the Articles in parentheses refer to the Article in light of which the respective concept has predomi-
nantly been examined by the Court; thus, there is a reference to a particular Article also for concepts that are not 
included in the text of the Article mentioned (e.g. “civil service” or “moral and physical integrity”).
114 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71, para. 167.
115 The Greek Case – Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Netherlands v. Greece, Commission Report of 05 November 
1969, nos. 3321/67, 3322/67, 3323/67 and 3344/67.
116 Ibid.
117 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71, para. 162.
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1999, the Court adopted a lower threshold in that it asserted that certain acts which 
were classified in the past as “inhuman and degrading treatment” as opposed to “tor-
ture” could be classified as “torture” (Selmouni v. France118).
Degrading treatment (Article 3)
This consists of treatment or punishment which grossly humiliates a person be-
fore himself or others or drives him to act against his will or conscience. “Degrading” 
is given its ordinary dictionary meaning. 
Slavery (Article 4)
The Court has adopted the classic definition of slavery contained in the 1926 
Slavery Convention, which requires the exercise of a genuine right of ownership and 
reduction of the status of the individual concerned to an “object” (Siliadin v. France119).
Servitude (Article 4)
Servitude is a “particularly serious form of denial of freedom” (Van Droogen-
broeck v. Belgium120). For Convention purposes it has been defined as “an obligation 
to provide one’s services that is imposed by the use of coercion” (Siliadin v. France121). 
It is to be linked with the concept of slavery, both of which are examined as questions 
of status. Servitude is also related to forced or compulsory labour (see below) and 
it has been regarded by the Court as an “aggravated” forced or compulsory labour; 
the distinguishing feature between them is the victim’s feeling that their condition is 
permanent and that it is unlikely to change. It is sufficient that this feeling is based on 
objective criteria (e.g. the obligation for the ‘serf ’ to live on another person’s property 
and the impossibility of altering his condition) or brought about or kept alive by those 
responsible for the situation (C.N. and V. v. France122).
Forced labour or Compulsory labour (Article 4)
“Labour” is not limited to the sphere of manual labour; the word has the broad 
meaning of all work or service (Van der Mussele v. Belgium123). The Court has used 
118 Selmouni v. France, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 28 July 1999, no. 25803/94, para. 101.
119 Siliadin v. France, judgment of 26 July 2005, no. 73316/01, para. 122.
120 Van Droogenbroeck v. Belgium, judgment of 24 June 1982, no. 7906/77, para. 58.
121 Siliadin v. France, judgment of 26 July 2005, no. 73316/01, para. 124.
122 C.N. and V. v. France, judgment of 11 October 2012, no. 67724/09, para. 91.
123 Van der Mussele v. Belgium, judgment of 23 November 1983, no. 8919/80, para. 33.
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the definition found in the ILO Convention No. 29124 as a starting point, and has ac-
cepted that for “forced or compulsory labour” to arise, there must be some physical or 
mental constraint, as suggested by the adjective “forced”, as well as some overriding of 
the person’s will, as suggested by the adjective “compulsory”. Accordingly, what there 
has to be is work exacted under the menace of any penalty and also performed 
against the will of the person concerned, that is, work for which they have not of-
fered themselves voluntarily (ibid.).
The notion of “penalty” found in the first criterion is used in the broad sense; 
it may go as far as physical violence or restraint, but it can also take subtler forms, of 
a psychological nature, such as threats to denounce victims to the police or immigra-
tion authorities when their employment status is illegal. See, for example, C.N. and V. 
v. France125, in which case the Court held that being sent back to her country of origin 
was seen by the first applicant as a “penalty” and the threat of being sent back as the 
“menace” of that “penalty” being executed126. In Chowdury and Others v. Greece127, the 
applicants, who were in a vulnerable situation as illegal migrants without resources at 
risk of being arrested, detained and deported, continued working because they were 
afraid that they would lose their overdue - and very low - wages, without which they 
could neither live elsewhere in Greece nor leave the country128. See also Rantsev v. 
Cyprus and Russia129, where the Court considered it unnecessary to identify whether 
the situation of the trafficked person constituted “slavery”, “servitude” or “forced and 
compulsory labour” and asserted that “trafficking itself…falls within the scope of Ar-
ticle 4”130.
As to the issue of whether the person offered themselves voluntarily for the 
work in question, the individual’s prior consent is not decisive; the Court will rather 
have regard to all the circumstances of the case in the light of the underlying objectives 
of Article 4, as these derive from the exceptions set out in paragraph 3 and include 
the general interest, social solidarity and what is normal in the ordinary course of 
business. In terms of the latter, the Court has taken into account whether the services 
rendered fall outside the ambit of the normal professional activities of the person con-
cerned; whether the services are remunerated or not or whether the service includes 
another compensatory factor; whether the obligation is founded on a conception of 
124 Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29) - Entry into force: 01 May 1932.
125 C.N. and V. v. France, judgment of 11 October 2012, no. 67724/09, paras. 68-79.
126 Id. para. 78.
127 Chowdury and Others v. Greece, judgment of 30 March 2017, no. 21884/15.
128 Id. para. 95. 
129 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, judgment of 7 January 2010, no. 25965/04.
130 Id. para. 282.
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social solidarity (e.g. regarding a medical practitioner’s duty to participate in an emer-
gency service); and whether the burden imposed is disproportionate.
Deprivation of liberty (Article 5)
Whether individuals are being deprived of their liberty or their movement is 
merely restricted depends on examination of the concrete situation, account being 
taken of the whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects, and manner 
of implementation of the measure in question (Guzzardi v. Italy131, Riera Blume v. 
Spain132, Koniarska v. the United Kingdom133, Austin and Others v. the United King-
dom134, Creangă v. Romania135). The distinction is important because deprivations of 
liberty are only permissible in an exhaustive list of situations and are regulated proce-
durally by Article 5. Restrictions on movement are regulated by Article 2 of Protocol 
4. De Tommaso v. Italy136 comprehensively discusses the difference between the two. 
In some cases such as detention under Article 5 § 1(f) the Court has dispensed with 
the requirement of necessity and proportionality (Saadi v. the United Kingdom137) 
which are still required for restrictions under Article 2 Protocol 4.
Security of the person (Article 5)
Although Article 5 § 1 guarantees the right to liberty and to “security of the per-
son,” this latter aspect has proved to have no independent existence. It cannot be used 
to cover ideas of physical integrity which fall, where appropriate, within the scope of 
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and more extreme cases, Article 3 
(prohibition of torture). The term security only refers to protection from arbitrariness 
in relation to deprivation of liberty.
Criminal (Article 6)
A person may have been subjected to a “criminal charge” or proceedings for the 
purpose of attracting the protection of Article 6 (right to a fair trial) even though no 
“criminal” proceedings in domestic law are involved. In determining the existence of 
131 Guzzardi v. Italy, judgment of 6 November 1980, no. 7367/76, para. 92.
132 Riera Blume v. Spain, judgment of 14 October 1999, no. 37680/97, para. 28.
133 Koniarska v. the United Kingdom, decision of 12 October 2000, no.  33670/96.
134 Austin and Others v. the United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 15 March 2012, nos. 39692/09, 
40713/09 and 41008/09, para. 57.
135 Creangă v. Romania, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, para. 91.
136 De Tommaso v. Italy, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 23 February 2017, no. 43395/09, paras. 80-89.
137 Saadi v. the United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 29 January 2008, no. 13229/03, para. 72.
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a “criminal” charge, Engel v. Netherlands138 established three criteria to be read in light 
of the autonomy of the concept under the Convention. The Convention institutions 
have regard to (i) the classification of the offence in domestic law, (ii) the nature of the 
offence and (iii) the severity of the penalty. It is clear that domestic classification is not 
determinative if it says a particular charge is not criminal in nature (see Öztürk v. Ger-
many139), but is determinative if it says that it is criminal. The Convention does NOT 
require that formal criminal proceedings are instituted in every case which it 
considers to be criminal. It does however require that the procedural safeguards 
of Article 6 are in place. Practitioners will want to be particularly aware of this where 
steps are taken or orders made which are based on conduct which could have been (or 
could be) the subject of criminal proceedings in national law and where a criminal 
charge, in Convention terms, may thus be involved.
Charge (Article 6)
“Charge” is “the official notification given to an individual by the competent 
authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence” or some other act 
which carries “the implication of such an allegation and which likewise substantially 
affects the situation of the suspect” (Corigliano v. Italy140or R.L. v. Netherlands141). In 
Deweer v. Belgium142, the Court found that a criminal charge had been made when 
a trader’s business was closed during investigations, though no criminal proceedings 
were ever instituted. If a suspect is arrested before being charged, a criminal “charge” 
exists from the date of their arrest, which has a major impact on their situation by 
enabling the authorities to conduct investigative measures with their participation 
(Simeonovi v. Bulgaria143). Neither extradition nor deportation proceedings (even 
where deportation is imposed as a criminal sanction) have been held to be covered by 
Article 6 (Maaouia v. France144)145.
138 Engel v. Netherlands, judgment of 8 June 1976, nos.  5100/71, 5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, and 5370/72, para. 82.
139 Öztürk v. Germany, judgment of 21 February 1984, no. 8544/79, paras. 49-50.
140 Corigliano v. Italy, judgment of 10 December 1982, no. 8304/78, para. 34.
141 R.L. v. Netherlands, decision of 18 May 1995, no. 22942/93, pp. 4-5.
142 Deweer v. Belgium, judgment of 27 February 1980, no. 6903/75, paras. 41-47.
143 Simeonovi v. Bulgaria, judgment [Grand Chamber] of 12 May 2017, no. 21980/04, para. 121.
144 Maaouia v. France, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 5 October 2000, no. 39652/98, para. 40.
145 In contrast, Article 47 (2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights offers wider protection in that respect, as “the 
right to a fair hearing is not confined to disputes relating to civil law rights and obligations” (Explanations relating 
to the Charter of Fundamental Rights). Nonetheless, considering that the meaning and scope of the rights in the 
EU Charter is the same as those laid down by the ECHR and as these have been interpreted by the Court, Article 
6(1) does apply to all matters covered by EU law and sets the minimum of protection for the purposes of the 
Convention.
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Civil right (Article 6)
The Convention institutions have refrained from formulating any abstract defi-
nition of “civil rights”. Instead they have ruled on the particular facts of each case. The 
concept of “civil rights” is not to be interpreted solely by reference to the respondent 
State’s domestic law but is an autonomous notion based on the character of the right 
(König v. Germany146). The pertinent issue is whether the outcome of the proceed-
ings is decisive for private rights and obligations. Furthermore, there must, at least 
on arguable grounds, be a basis for the right in domestic law, irrespective of whether 
that right is protected under the Convention (Micallef v. Malta147). The character of 
the legislation which governs how the matter is to be determined (civil, commercial, 
administrative law, and so on) or the nature of the authority which is invested with 
jurisdiction in the matter (ordinary court, administrative body, and so forth) are not 
of decisive consequence (ibid.).
Determination (Article 6)
In civil cases this refers to any proceedings which are decisive of civil rights and 
obligations. In criminal cases this refers to judgment and any subsequent appeals.
Scope of the right to a fair trial (Article 6)
The right to a fair trial under Article 6 is not confined to the conduct of judicial 
proceedings. Where issues which fall within the scope of Article 6 arise, it reaches 
back to the administrative stages of decision making (e.g. in child care cases) and 
forward to the execution of the judgment (Hornsby v. Greece148). It also requires that 
there should be legal certainty, that is, consistency between judgments on the same 
issues delivered by different courts (e.g. Vincic and Others v. Serbia149, Tudor Tudor 
v. Romania150, Stoilkovska v. Macedonia151). It does not apply to matters which have 
been considered to be purely administrative such as deportation or extradition.
146 König v. Germany, judgment of 28 June 1978, no. 6232/73, paras. 88-90.
147 Micallef v. Malta, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 15 October 2009, no. 17056/06, para. 74.
148 Hornsby v Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, no. 18357/91, para. 40.
149 Vincic and Others v. Serbia, judgment of 1 December 2009, nos. 44698/06, 44700/06, 44722/06 and other, para. 
56.
150 Tudor Tudor v. Romania, judgment of 24 March 2009, no. 21911/03, paras. 26-32.
151 Stoilkovska v. Macedonia, judgment of 18 July 2013, no. 29784/07, paras. 39-40 and 44-49.
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Independent tribunal (Article 6)
The phrase is to be found in Article 6(1), where the requirement of an “inde-
pendent and impartial tribunal” is set out. The Court has considered that the concepts 
of independence and impartiality (see below) are related but quite distinct (Pullar v. 
the United Kingdom152). 
An independent tribunal is a tribunal that is independent of the executive and of 
the parties to the case. In determining whether a tribunal can be considered to be inde-
pendent, the Court has had regard, inter alia, to the manner of appointment of its mem-
bers and the duration of their term of office (e.g. a short renewable term may be ques-
tionable, see Incal v. Turkey153), the existence of guarantees against outside pressures 
(e.g. not taking instructions from the executive or not accepting as binding the executive’s 
advice on the interpretation of treaties, see the Greek Interstate case and Beaumartin v. 
France154 respectively), and the question whether there is a legitimate doubt regarding 
the appearance of independence (see Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom155).
Impartial tribunal (Article 6 § 1)
Impartiality means lack of prejudice or bias; for the determination of impar-
tiality, there are two aspects to be considered: a) the tribunal must be subjectively 
impartial, that is, no member of the tribunal should hold any personal prejudice or 
bias.  Personal impartiality is to be presumed in duly appointed judges unless there 
is evidence to the contrary; b) the tribunal must also be impartial from an objective 
viewpoint. In this respect even appearances may be of a certain importance. What is 
at stake is the confidence which the courts in a democratic society must inspire in the 
public and above all in the accused, as far as criminal proceedings are concerned, or, 
in civil cases, in the parties. The standpoint of the latter is important but not decisive; 
the crucial issue is whether there is a legitimate reason to fear a lack of impartiality 
(Hauschildt v. Denmark156). 
Tribunal (Article 6)
The word “tribunal” in Article 6 § 1 is not necessarily to be understood as 
signifying a court of law of the classic kind, integrated within the standard judicial 
152 Pullar v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 10 June 1996, no. 22399/93, para. 29.
153 Incal v. Turkey, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 9 June 1998, no. 22678/93, paras. 65 and 68.
154 Beaumartin v. France, judgment of 24 November 1994, no. 15287/89, para. 38.
155 Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 June 1984, nos. 7819/77 and 7878/77, paras. 78 and 85.
156 Hauschildt v. Denmark, judgment of 24 May 1989, no. 10486/83, para. 48.
40 Towards a More Effective National Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights
machinery of the country (Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom157). The criterion 
is rather that the institution in question has full jurisdiction to take legally binding 
decisions which may not be altered by a non-judicial authority (Findlay v. the United 
Kingdom158). The fact, however, that the institution exercises judicial functions does 
not suffice. The use of the term “tribunal” is “warranted only for an organ which sat-
isfies a series of further requirements” (Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. 
Belgium159), such as independence and impartiality, as discussed above.
Civil Service (Article 6 § 1)
In its leading judgment in Pellegrin v. France160, the Court held that it was im-
portant, with a view to applying Article 6(1), to establish an autonomous interpreta-
tion of the term “civil service” which would make it possible to afford equal treatment 
to public servants, irrespective of the legal nature in domestic law of the relation be-
tween the official and the administrative authority. To that end, the Court has adopted 
a functional criterion based on the nature of the official’s duties and responsibilities. 
The Court will seek to ascertain in each case whether the applicant’s post entailed 
direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers conferred by public law and 
duties designed to safeguard the general interests of the State or of other public au-
thorities (Frydlender v. France161). A manifest example would be the duties of the 
armed forces and the police.
Family (Article 8)
The concept of the “family” is now understood as extending beyond formal 
legitimate relationships and arrangements (Johnston and Others v. Ireland162). The 
Convention organs have increasingly taken into account the substance and reality 
of relationships, acknowledging developments in social practices and the law in Eu-
ropean states. Historically, the European Court of Human Rights did not generally 
recognise homosexual relationships as family life but as a part of private life. However 
the Court now considers that where such a relationship is akin to marriage it can be 
considered family life.
157 Campbell and Fell v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 June 1984, nos. 7819/77 and 7878/77, para. 76.
158 Findlay v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 February 1997, no. 22107/93, para. 77.
159 Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, judgment of 23 June 1981, nos. 6878/75 and 7238/75, para. 55.
160 Pellegrin v France, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 8 December 1999, no. 28541/95, para. 63.
161 Frydlender v. France, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 27 June 2000, no. 30979/96, paras. 33-41.
162 Johnston v Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, no. 9697/82, paras 55-56.
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Private life (Article 8)
This concept embraces the sphere of immediate personal autonomy. This cov-
ers aspects of moral and physical integrity (X and Y v. Netherlands163) (see also below 
under “moral and physical integrity”). It is wider than the right to “privacy” in the 
sense of being able to keep hidden or secret things which one does not want to dis-
close or expose. Private life ensures a sphere within which everyone can freely pursue 
the development and fulfilment of his personality. This comprises the right to an iden-
tity (including names and one’s own image) and includes the right to develop relation-
ships with other people, in particular in the emotional field and including sexual rela-
tionships with other persons, as well as activities of a professional or business nature 
(Niemietz v. Germany164). It includes the “network of personal social and economic 
relations that make up the private life of every human being” (Slivenko v. Latvia165). 
The Court has now recognised that a person’s reputation will often be significant in 
developing those relationships and as such is therefore protected under this rubric of 
Article 8. The right to one’s image has been examined with respect to the publication 
of photos of people that are, generally or have come temporarily to be, in the public 
eye (in which cases the Court has realised a balancing exercise between the right to 
private life and the freedom of expression, see Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2)166) 
as well as “ordinary persons” (in which cases no interference could be justified by a 
legitimate aim protected by the Convention, see (Georgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia167).
Moral and physical integrity (Article 8)
An individual’s “moral and physical integrity”, that is, physical and psychologi-
cal well-being, is protected under the private life rubric of Article 8 (see above under 
“private life”).
It is, however, also a term that is being used in connection to treatment or con-
ditions that fall below the “threshold of severity” required by Article 3 (Costello-Rob-
erts v. the United Kingdom and Raninen v. Finland168).
163 X and Y v Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80, para. 22.
164 Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, no. 13710/88, para. 29.
165 Slivenko v. Latvia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 9 October 2003, no. 48321/99, para. 96.
166 Von Hannover v. Germany (No. 2), [Grand Chamber] judgment of 7 February 2012, nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, 
paras 95-126.
167 Georgi Nikolaishvili v. Georgia, judgment of 13 January 2009, no. 37048/04, para. 123.
168 Costello-Roberts v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1993, no. 13134/87, paras. 29-36, and Raninen 
v. Finland, judgment of 16 December 1997, no. 20972/92, paras. 52-64.
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Home (Article 8)
Home has been given a wide definition by the Convention organs.  It is not 
necessary that a home be lawfully established, with significance attaching more to the 
nature of the occupation than to its legality, but it does not extend to a place which 
one would like to occupy as one’s home. Further, since “home” and “private life” may 
overlap with business and professional activities, the protection of Article 8 (right to 
respect for private and family life) has been found to extend to personal offices (Nie-
mietz v. Germany169) and for companies to company premises (Société Colas Est and 
Others v. France170).
Freedom of expression (Article 10)
Considered as one of the essential foundations of a democratic society, one of 
the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man (Handyside 
v. the United Kingdom171), freedom of expression has been interpreted broadly; ac-
cordingly, any potential exceptions to it has been interpreted narrowly (Sunday times 
v. the United Kingdom (No.1)172). The Article covers not only “information” or “ideas” 
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, 
but also those that offend, shock or disturb (Handyside v. the United Kingdom173), 
including incitement to hatred, obscenity and blasphemy, and pornography.
Any content is protected (e.g. political views, advertising, artistic expression, 
etc.) as is any means of expression, including (but not limited to) books, leaflets, car-
toons, paintings, workshops and seminars, dissemination via the internet and press. 
In fact, in their exercise of this right, persons or organisations are entitled to choose 
which means they consider appropriate (e.g. Women on Waves and Others v. Portu-
gal174). Among these means, press is of particular importance in light of its vital role 
in democratic societies as a “public watchdog” (e.g. Financial Times Ltd and Others 
v. the United Kingdom175)176. Such a role of a “public watchdog” has been recognised 
for civil societies and as a result their activities have been considered to warrant sim-
ilar Convention protection to that afforded to the press (Youth Initiative for Human 
169 Niemietz v. Germany, judgment of 16 December 1992, no. 13710/88, para. 30.
170 Société Colas Est and Others v. France, judgment of 16 April 2002, no. 37971/97, paras. 40-41.
171 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 December 1976, no. 5493/72, para. 49.
172 Sunday times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), judgment 26 April 1979, no. 6538/74, para. 65.
173 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 7 December 1976, no. 5493/72, para. 49.
174 Women on Waves and Others v. Portugal, judgment of 3 February 2009, no. 31276/05, para. 38.
175 Financial Times Ltd and Others v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 15 December 2009, no.  821/03, para. 59.
176 See also Sunday times v. the United Kingdom, judgment 26 April 1979, no. 6538/74.
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Rights v. Serbia177; see also Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina178).
In light of the role of the press and civil societies as a public watchdog, the 
Court broadened its approach vis-à-vis a potential right to receive information under 
Article 10. In Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary179 and Youth Initiative for Hu-
man Rights v. Serbia180, where the Court re-visited its previous case law on the matter, 
the conclusion was that Article 10 does not confer on the individual a right of access 
to information held by a public authority nor obliges the Government to impart such 
information to the individual. However, such a right or obligation may arise, firstly, 
where disclosure of the information has been imposed by a judicial order which has 
gained legal force and, secondly, in circumstances where access to the information is 
instrumental for the individual’s exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression, 
in particular “the freedom to receive and impart information” and where its denial 
constitutes an interference with that right.
Associations (Article 11)
The Court has examined the meaning of the autonomous concept of “associa-
tions” in light of the link between democracy, pluralism and freedom of association 
(Chassagnou and others v. France181). An obvious example of “associations” playing a 
crucial role in ensuring pluralism and democracy are political parties. However, the 
concept includes any legal entity established by individuals with the aim to act collec-
tively in a field of mutual interest, such as associations protecting cultural or spiritual 
heritage, pursuing various socio-economic aims, proclaiming or teaching religion, 
seeking an ethnic identity or asserting a minority consciousness (Gorzelik and others 
v Poland182). Where an association has both private and public law characteristics, the 
Court will examine which characteristics prevail. For example, in Sigurjonsson v. Ice-
land183, the Court concluded that, although the association under question performed 
177 Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, judgment of 25 June 2013, no. 48135/06, para. 20.
178 Medžlis Islamske Zajednice Brčko and Others v. Bosnia and Herzegovina [Grand Chamber] judgment of 27 
June 2017, no. 17224/11, paras. 86-87. The Court held that the criteria that generally apply to the dissemination 
of defamatory statements by the media in the exercise of its public watchdog also apply to NGOs; these include, 
inter alia, the requirement to verify factual statements (paras. 108-109).
179 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 08 November 2016, no. 18030/11.
180 Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, judgment of 25 June 2013, no. 48135/06.
181 Chassagnou and others v. France, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 29 April 1999, nos. 25088/94, 28331/95 and 
28443/95, para. 100.
182 Gorzelik and others v. Poland, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 17 February 2004, no. 44158/98, para. 92.
183 Sigurjonsson v. Iceland, judgment of 30 June 1993, no. 16130/90.
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certain functions which were to some extent provided for in the applicable legislation 
and served not only its members but also the public at large, the association had in 
fact been established under private law and enjoyed full autonomy in determining its 
own aims, organisation and procedure184.
Right to marry (Article 12)
The wording of Article 12 has been considered to suggest that the right to mar-
ry is limited to unions between a man and a woman. In Christine Goodwin v. the Unit-
ed Kingdom185, the Court accepted that the right to marry extends to transsexuals, on 
the basis that the terms “men” and “women” can no longer be assumed to refer to a 
determination of gender by purely biological criteria186. On the contrary, it does not 
extend to same-sex marriages, as at the time that the Court gave its ruling in Schalk 
and Kopf v. Austria187, there seemed to be no European consensus regarding the is-
sue188. The right to marry does not include a right to divorce (Johnston and Others v. 
Ireland189). In contrast to the wider Article 8, the right to found a family in Article 12 
seems to be restricted to married couples. The right of same-sex couples to form civil 
unions has, for example, been examined in light of Article 14 taken together with 
Article 8 (see Vallianatos and Others v. Greece190).
Effective remedy (Article 13)
The remedy available at national level to deal with “arguable complaints” re-
garding the substance of rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention must be 
effective in practice as well as in law (e.g. Iovchev v. Bulgaria191) – in the sense either 
of preventing the alleged violation, or remedying the impugned state of affairs, or of 
providing adequate redress for any violation that has already occurred. 
Various factors may play a role when determining the effectiveness of a remedy: 
the circumstances of the case (for example, compensation may not be enough, e.g. 
184 Id. para. 31.
185 Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 11 July 2002, no. 28957/95.
186 Id. para. 100.
187 Schalk and Kopf v. Austria, judgment of 24 June 2010, no. 30141/04.
188 Id. para. 58.
189 Johnston v. Ireland, judgment of 18 December 1986, no. 9697/82, paras. 51-54.
190 Vallianatos and Others v. Greece, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 7 November 2013, nos. 29381/09 and 32684/09, 
paras. 70-92.
191 Iovchev v. Bulgaria, judgment of 2 February 2006, no. 41211/98, par. 142.
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Petkov and Others v. Bulgaria192), the powers and the procedural guarantees which 
the competent national authority affords (e.g. Klass and Others v. Germany193), or 
the right relied on (for example, in expulsion cases, where there is a complaint of a 
real risk of violation of the person’s rights under Article 2, or Article 3, or Article 4 of 
Protocol No. 4, effectiveness also requires that there is access to a remedy with auto-
matic suspensive effect; see De Souza Ribeiro v. France194). Although the context of the 
violation complained of is also relevant (for example, in Klass and Others v. Germany, 
the Court has found that the remedy must be as effective as can be having regard to 
the restricted scope for recourse inherent in a system of secret surveillance195; even in 
such cases though there is a minimum standard guaranteed by Article 13 (Al-Nashif 
v. Bulgaria196) ), this context is seen in light of the particular Article relied on; thus, 
the requirement of a remedy “as effective as can be” may be appropriate when exam-
ining Articles 8 and 10, whose examination may require the Court to have regard to 
the national security claims advanced by the Government, whereas it is not in cases 
where irreversible harm may occur in respect of a complaint under Article 3 (Chahal 
v. the United Kingdom197).
Victim (Article 34)
A victim is an individual, group of individuals, or non-governmental organi-
sation whose rights under the Convention have been violated or are threatened with 
violation. Legal persons such as companies can be victims of Convention violations 
as well as natural persons (human beings). It is not necessary to show quantifiable 
damage to be a victim or to bring national proceedings under the Convention. 
Complaints to the Strasbourg Court may be declared inadmissible if the victim has suf-
fered “no significant disadvantage” but the person (legal or physical) is still a “victim” 
of a violation for the purposes of national law. The question of damage suffered (as op-
posed to “no significant disadvantage”) is only relevant to the issue of just satisfaction.
Property or possessions (Article 1 Protocol 1)
These terms cover a wide range of interests. Possession has an autonomous 
meaning not limited to ownership of physical goods – other rights and interests 
constituting assets can also be regarded as property rights (Gasus Dosier v. The 
192 Petkov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 11 June 2009, nos. 77568/01, 178/02 and 505/02, para. 79.
193 Klass and Others v. Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, no. 5029/71, para. 67.
194 De Souza Ribeiro v. France, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 13 December 2012, no. 22689/07, para. 82.
195 Klass and Others v. Germany, judgment of 6 September 1978, no. 5029/71, para. 69.
196 Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, judgment of 20 June 2002, no. 50963/99, para. 137.
197 Chahal v. the United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 15 November 1996, no. 22414/93, paras. 150-151.
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Netherlands198) including an enforceable judgment debt (Ryabykh v. Russia199; see 
also the Stran Greek Refineries case200). It is the debt itself which is the possession, 
as Article 1 of Protocol 1 only applies to existing possessions and does not otherwise 
confer a right to obtain property (Marckx v. Belgium201). There is also some authority 
for the view that a trivial effect on property rights will not constitute an interference 
(Langborger v Sweden202).
Collective expulsion/rejection (Article 4 of Protocol 4)
The wrong addressed by this provision is the absence of an individualised as-
sessment of each individual’s situation and not the consequences of the expulsion or 
rejection as is the case, for example, with rejected asylum seekers who are at risk of 
prohibited ill-treatment. It applies to all aliens/migrants. It can apply to group expul-
sions (see e.g. Čonka v. Belgium203) or to group pushbacks at the border (see e.g. N.D. 
and N.T. v. Spain204). But not all expulsions of a group of people will be collective (see 
Khlaifia and Others v. Italy205, in which case no violation of Article 4 of Protocol 4 
was found on the basis that each of the applicants had been identified individually 
and they had had a genuine and effective possibility of raising arguments against their 
expulsion206). It is a rapidly evolving area of the law.
ii. Convention concepts that have been developed jurisprudentially
Equality of arms
Parties to a dispute or charged with a criminal offence must not be placed at 
a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis their opponent. The requirement of “equality of 
arms”, in the sense of a “fair balance” between the parties, applies to criminal cases as 
198 Gasus Dosier v. The Netherlands, judgment of 23 February 1995, no. 15375/89, para. 53.
199 Ryabykh v. Russia, judgment of 24 July 2003, no. 52854/99, para. 61.
200 Stran Greek Refineries and Stratis Andreadis v. Greece, judgment of 09 December 1994, no. 13427/87, paras. 
59-62.
201 Marckx v Belgium, judgment of 13 June 1979, no. 6833/74, para. 50.
202 Langborger v. Sweden, judgment of 22 June 1989, no. 11179/84, para. 41.
203 Čonka v. Belgium, judgment of 5 February 2002, no. 51564/99, paras. 59-63.
204 N.D. and N.T. v. Spain, judgment of 3 October 2017, nos. 8675/15 and 8697/15, paras. 103-105. On 29 Janu-
ary 2018 the Grand Chamber Panel accepted the government’s request that the case be referred to the Grand 
Chamber.
205 Khlaifia and Others v. Italy, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 15 December 2016, no. 16483/12.
206 Id. paras. 248-254.
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well as civil rights and obligations cases (see Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands207). 
The appearance of the fair administration of justice and the seriousness of what is at 
stake for the applicant is of relevance when assessing the adequacy and fairness of the 
procedures (A.B. v. Slovakia208). It is irrelevant whether “further, quantifiable unfair-
ness” derived from procedural inequality (Bulut v. Austria209).
Inherent procedural safeguards 
Inherent procedural safeguards are found by the Court to be contained in Arti-
cles 2, 3 and 8 in themselves and exist in addition to the protection offered by Article 
13 and, where appropriate, Article 6. Article 6 affords a procedural safeguard in the 
determination of civil rights and obligations but only if they exist in national law. 
In contrast, the procedural requirements inherent in Article 8 cover administrative 
procedures as well as judicial proceedings but often afford protection where no right 
otherwise exists in national law (McMichael v. the United Kingdom210). 
Effectiveness of Rights - “practical and effective not theoretical and illusory” 
The Convention is a system for the protection of human rights. This makes it of 
crucial importance that it is interpreted and applied in a manner which renders these 
rights practical and effective not theoretical and illusory. A State cannot therefore 
fulfil its obligations by protecting a right in a superficial or self-defeating manner. Al-
though Article 1 requires that national law should protect Convention rights (express-
ly or in substance) this is a necessary but not sufficient requirement. Effective protec-
tion must exist in practice. For example, it is not enough for an accused simply to be 
provided with a lawyer. The legal assistance given must be effective (Artico v. Italy211). 
Law and quality of law
To meet a Convention requirement that an interference is “in accordance with 
the law” or “prescribed by law” that law must be precise and ascertainable so that 
an individual may regulate his conduct by it: they must be able - if need be with ap-
propriate legal advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, 
the consequences which a given action may entail. The law must also be adequately 
accessible, that is, the citizen must be able to have an indication about its existence 
207 Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, judgment of 27 October 1993, no. 14448/88, para. 33.
208 A.B. v. Slovakia, judgment of 04 March 2003, no. 41784/98, para. 55. 
209 Bulut v. Austria, judgment of 22 February 1996, no. 17358/90, para. 49.
210 McMichael v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 24 February 1995, no. 16424/90, para. 90.
211 Artico v. Italy, judgment of 13 May 1980, no. 6694/74, para. 33.
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that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case (Sun-
day times v. the United Kingdom212). A law authorising interferences with Convention 
rights must not be so broadly worded that it permits interferences which would vio-
late the Convention (see Hashman and Harrup v. the United Kingdom213).
Living instrument 
The Court has frequently emphasised that Convention protection and the con-
tent of the rights are not frozen at the date at which the text was adopted more than 
sixty years ago. The Convention is a “living instrument” (Tyrer v. the United King-
dom214) and the case law must therefore be “dynamic and evolutive” so that it is not 
a bar to reform or improvement (e.g. Bayatyan v. Armenia215). Matters such as sexu-
al behaviour, the changing nature of family structures, and prisoners’ rights have all 
been interpreted in the light of a consensus of modern European thinking. The Con-
vention jurisprudence is conservative and follows rather than leads the consensus.
VII. POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
The Convention largely protects individuals from interferences by the State 
with their fundamental rights. It thus imposes negative obligations on States to re-
frain from such interferences. However, Article 1 also demands that States “secure” 
the rights. The Court has therefore held in many cases that States are under a positive 
obligation to take steps to ensure that Convention rights are protected, not just to 
refrain from negative interferences. These positive obligations can take many forms; 
these may be grouped in two main types: a) substantive positive obligations, which 
concern the substantive measures that the State must put in place in order to secure 
that anyone in their jurisdiction fully enjoys the Convention rights and freedoms (e.g. 
adopting legislation that prohibits, say, forced or compulsory labour), and b) pro-
cedural, which concern the procedures that the State must put in place in order to 
respond to any alleged violation (e.g. carry out an adequate and effective investigation 
when a violation of a Convention right is alleged).
The most obvious form of the State’s positive obligations is that contained in 
Article 13 to provide an effective remedy before national authority for any violations 
of the protected rights.
212 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom, judgment 26 April 1979, no. 6538/74, para. 49.
213 Hashman and Harrup v. UK, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 25 November 1999, no. 25594/94, paras. 31-43.
214 Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 25 April 1978, no. 5856/72, para. 31.
215 Bayatyan v. Armenia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 7 July 2011, no. 23459/03, paras. 98 and 102.
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Article 1 also demands that a judicial sanction must exist to protect certain 
rights and in some cases the Court has gone so far as to state that this must be a crim-
inal sanction (X and Y v. the Netherlands216). At very least a State must have in place 
laws which ensure that Convention rights are adequately protected from infringe-
ments both by State officials and private individuals.
The State is also under a duty to have allocated sufficient resources to its justice 
system to ensure that judicial proceedings are dealt with expeditiously (Guincho v 
Portugal217). But the positive obligations go further than this.
The State must also take active steps to ensure that individuals can exercise 
their Convention rights in practice. In Artze fur das Leben v Austria218 the Court held 
that, not only was the State obligated under Articles 10 and 11 to permit a demon-
stration to take place, but it was also obligated to protect the demonstrators from 
the actions of counter demonstrators. The Court set out in the case of Osman v. the 
United Kingdom219 a test which has since been applied many times: “Did the State 
take all reasonable steps to protect an individual from harm of which it knew or 
ought to have known?”220
Hoffmann v. Austria221 concerned a private law child custody dispute between 
parents. The Austrian Government maintained that it was therefore not responsible 
for the result of the legal dispute which was a purely private matter. The Court dis-
agreed, holding that the State was responsible through its courts for providing the 
necessary protection for Convention rights where their enjoyment is affected by dis-
putes between private persons222.
216 X and Y v. the  Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, no. 8978/80, para. 27.
217 Guincho v. Portugal, judgment of 10 July 1984, no. 8990/80, para. 40.
218 Plattform “Ärzte für das Leben” v. Austria, judgment of 21 June 1988, no. 10126/82, para. 32.
219 Osman v. the United Kingdom, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 28 October 1998, no. 23452/94.
220 Id. para. 116.
221 Hoffmann v. Austria, judgment of 23 June 1993, no. 12875/87.
222 Id. paras. 32-36.
50 Towards a More Effective National Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights
Chapter 3
Short guide to the system of the ECtHR
This chapter provides an overview of the way the system of the Court’s deliberation works, from the moment an application is filed until after a final judgment is delivered. Its aim is not to provide a thorough pre-
sentation of the procedure before the Court, but rather to make the reader familiar 
with the main tools of the Court’s deliberation and facilitate the use of its decisions 
and judgments in the domestic legal order. Thus, the first subpart provides an outline 
of an application’s path, whereas more attention has been given to the second and 
third subparts, which present the different means of the Court’s deliberation and ex-
emplify the importance of the stage starting after a judgment respectively.
I. AN APPLICATION’S PATH
 After an application is filed with the Registry, the case is allocated to a judi-
cial formation, either a single-judge formation or a Committee or a Chamber depend-
ing on the circumstances (see section II below), which will decide on the application’s 
admissibility. Nowadays, the admissibility and the merits of an application are most 
often examined and decided together; thus, a decision purely on admissibility is in 
almost all cases a simple decision to declare the case inadmissible unless the case rais-
es an important issue about admissibility (e.g. Banković and Others v. Belgium and 
Others223). Unless a friendly settlement is reached or a Committee of 3 judges delivers 
a judgment on the merits (see section II below), a Chamber of the Court will go on to 
examine the case. The Chamber will deliver its judgment unless it relinquishes its ju-
risdiction to the Grand Chamber under Article 30 (see section II below). The parties 
have the right to request referral of a case to the Grand Chamber within a period of 3 
months from the date of the delivery of the judgment of a Chamber. If such request is 
accepted, the Grand Chamber examines the case and delivers a final judgment. Final 
judgments are transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
(hereafter, “Committee of Ministers”), which is responsible for supervising their exe-
cution by the respondent State (Article 46(2))224.
223 Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, [Grand Chamber] decision of 12 December 2001, no. 52207/99.
224 The Committee of Ministers is the Council of Europe’s statutory decision-making body and is made up of rep-
resentatives of the governments of the 47 Member States. Its powers regarding the supervision of the execution 
of the Court’s judgments are governed by the “Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the 
execution of judgments and of the terms of friendly settlements”, hereafter “Rules of the Committee”. In this task, 
the Committee is assisted by the Department for the Execution of Judgments of the Court.
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II. THE COURT’S VOICE
i. Tools of judicial deliberation
From the time an application is allocated to a formation, the Court, in each 
different formation depending on the circumstances of the case and the stage of the 
proceedings, will rule on the admissibility and, where appropriate, the merits of an 
application, using the following tools of deliberation:
a. Decisions: admissibility
The Court rules on the admissibility of a case by means of a decision. Decisions 
on inadmissibility are final.
The admissibility criteria are set out in Article 35 and include the exhaustion 
of all domestic remedies and a time limit of six months225 from the date on which 
the final decision was taken at the domestic level (Article 35 § 1). Further admissibil-
ity criteria are set out in paragraphs 2 and 3 as regards individual applications. These 
include the requirement that an application is not anonymous and that it has not 
previously been examined by the Court or already submitted to another international 
225 This will be shortened to four months once Protocol 15 enters into force.
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body unless it contains relevant new information. Furthermore, an application shall 
not be incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols, mani-
festly ill-founded or an abuse of the right of individual application. The Court usu-
ally makes a specific statement regarding the question of whether an application as a 
whole or a particular complaint is manifestly ill-founded. This is largely a question as 
to whether, following a preliminary assessment of the substance of the case, there is 
no appearance of a violation and thus no need for further examination on the merits.
Protocol 14 added a second limb to paragraph 3 of Article 35; which introduced 
a further admissibility criterion requiring that the applicant has suffered a significant 
disadvantage (Article 35 § 3 (b). This was inspired by the principle de minimis non cu-
rat praetor and based on “the idea that a violation of a right should attain a minimum 
level of severity to warrant consideration by an international Court” (Korolev v. Rus-
sia)226. Two “safeguard clauses”227 have, however, been included in that limb to ensure 
that, even where the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, the Court 
goes on to examine the merits of the case: (i) if respect for human rights as defined in 
the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires it to do so, or (ii) if the application 
has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal. Note, however, that the second 
proviso is going to be removed once Protocol 15 enters into force.
The competence of the Court ratione personae, ratione materiae, ratione loci 
and ratione temporis (see Chapter 1) is examined as part of the admissibility of a case, 
namely in respect of the criterion included in Article 35 § 1 (a) concerning the com-
patibility of the application with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols 
thereto.
Note that if a friendly settlement is effected, the Court also strikes the case out 
by means of a decision (Article 39).
Competence to deliver a decision:
• A single-judge formation: inadmissibility of an individual application 
may be declared when it is obvious without further examination of the 
case (Article 27), for example, when it is clear that domestic remedies have 
not been exhausted. These decisions are not published; the applicant is 
informed by letter without details of the reasons for the decision. If the 
application is not obviously inadmissible, the judge refers the case to a 
226 Korolev v. Russia, decision of 1 July 2010, no. 25551/05, p.4.
227 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention.
53Guide to Key Convention Principles and Concepts and Their Use in Domestic Courts
three-judge Committee or a Chamber; they do not have the power to de-
clare the application admissible by themselves.
• Committees of 3 judges: inadmissibility of an individual application may 
be declared by a unanimous vote, where such decision can be taken with-
out further examination (Article 28 § 1 (a)). If the Committee cannot reach 
a unanimous vote, the case is referred to a Chamber.
• A Chamber (7 judges): With regard to individual applications, if no de-
cision is taken under Article 27 or 28 by the above Court formations, or 
no judgment rendered under Article 28 by a Committee (see below), a 
Chamber consisting of seven judges shall decide on the admissibility of 
an individual application; it usually decides on the admissibility and the 
merits together, but it has the power to do so separately. The Chamber is 
competent to decide on the admissibility of inter-State applications as well; 
in such cases, it decides on admissibility separately unless it decides, in 
exceptional cases, otherwise.
• Grand Chamber (17 judges): When the Grand Chamber has assumed ju-
risdiction over a case (see below at the part regarding judgments) it may 
itself deliver a decision on the application’s admissibility, as under Article 
35(4) applications may be dismissed as inadmissible “at any stage of the 
proceedings”.
b. Judgments: merits
The Court rules on the merits of a case by means of a judgment.
Competence to deliver a judgment:
• Committees of 3 judges: they may render a judgment on the merits of a 
case stemming from an individual application, if the underlying question 
in the case is already the subject of well-established case law of the Court 
(Article 28(1)b). For example, imprisonment of persons who have been 
remanded or detained pending expulsion in police stations for between 
one and three months has repeatedly been considered contrary to Article 
3 due to the nature of police stations per se (e.g. Iatropoulos and Others v. 
Greece)228. The judgments of the Committees are final.
228 Iatropoulos and Others v. Greece, (First Section Committee) judgment of 20 April 2017, no. 23262/13, para. 38.
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• A Chamber (7 judges): delivers judgments on the merits of individual and 
inter-state applications. The parties have 3 months following the delivery of a 
Chamber judgment to request referral of the case to the Grand Chamber for 
fresh consideration. Requests for referral to the Grand Chamber are exam-
ined by a panel of judges which decides whether or not referral is appropriate 
(Article 43). The judgment becomes final under the conditions of Article 44(2).
• Grand Chamber (17 judges): delivers judgments when a Chamber has re-
linquished jurisdiction under Article 30 (serious questions are raised or 
issues of inconsistency with previous case-law may arise) or when the case 
has been referred to it following a party’s request under Article 43. The 
judgments of the Grand Chamber are final.
c. Pilot Judgments: repetitive or clone cases
The Court may initiate a pilot-judgment procedure and adopt a pilot judgment 
where the facts of an application reveal in the Contracting Party concerned the ex-
istence of a structural or systemic problem or other similar dysfunction which has 
given rise or may give rise to similar applications229. The Court examines one or more 
of these applications, whereas the examination of the rest of the cases is adjourned. In 
its judgment, the Court calls on the State concerned to bring the domestic legislation 
into line with the Convention, indicating the general measures to be taken.
ii. Advisory opinions
At present, advisory opinions may be solicited by the Committee of Ministers, 
according to Article 46 or Article 47. There has not yet been any advisory opinion 
regarding the execution of judgments according to Article 46, but this is expected to 
change. After the entry into force of Protocol 16, the highest courts and tribunals of a 
State Party to the Convention will have the possibility to request the Court to give ad-
visory opinions on questions of principle relating to the interpretation or application 
of the rights and freedoms of the Convention.
229 See Rule 61 of the Court.
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III. AFTER THE JUDGMENT
i. The legal obligation of States to execute the Court’s judgments
The final judgments of the Court are binding for the respondent State, that 
was a party to the case (Article 46 § 1). Although, formally, only the respondent State 
is bound by the obligation to abide by and execute a final judgment. However, it is 
important that other States draw conclusions from a judgment issued against anoth-
er State if they face a similar problem, so that they avoid being eventually found in 
breach of the Convention themselves (see Chapter 4 of the handbook). 
Turning to the content of the obligation to execute a final judgment under Ar-
ticle 46, the Court has repeatedly held that this is not limited to paying the injured 
party the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction; it also includes “the obligation to 
take further individual and/or, if appropriate, general measures in its domestic legal 
order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress the effects”230. 
Accordingly, the obligation to execute a judgment includes the following:
a. The obligation to pay just satisfaction to the injured party-Article 41
Just satisfaction is determined by the Court and may be awarded in respect of:
(a) pecuniary damage, which can involve compensation both for loss actually 
suffered and loss, or diminished gain, to be expected in the future
(b) non-pecuniary damage
(c) costs and expenses that the injured party has incurred (both at the domes-
tic level and in the proceedings before the Court) in trying to prevent the 
violation from occurring, or in trying to obtain redress therefore
b. Other individual measures
The respondent State has the obligation to put the injured party, as far as pos-
sible, in the same situation as that party was prior to the violation of the Convention 
(restitutio in integrum)231. To that end, further individual measures may be required 
in addition to the award of just satisfaction. Individual measures, as well as general 
measures (mentioned below) are usually determined at the stage of the judgment’s 
230 Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (No 2), [Grand Chamber] judgment of 30 June 2009, no. 
32772/02, para. 85.
231 This principle has been adopted by the Court and applied by the Committee of Ministers in several resolutions 
(Explanatory memorandum of the Recommendation No. R (2000) 2).
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execution under the supervision of the Committee of Ministers; the Court indicates 
specific measures only exceptionally (see below in subpart (ii) of this section).
Examples include: “the striking out of an unjustified criminal conviction from 
the criminal records, the granting of a residence permit, or the reopening of im-
pugned domestic proceedings”.232,233 Further examples are: the release of those found 
to be held illegally, facilitating contact between a parent and child in public care, or 
re-establishing parental visitation rights.
c. General measures
The State  has an obligation (deriving from Article 46 § 1 and Article 1) to adopt 
general measures to prevent new violations similar to that or those found or to put an 
end to continuing violations.
Examples include: “legislative or regulatory amendments, changes of case-law 
or administrative practice or publication of the Court’s judgment in the language of 
the respondent state and its dissemination to the authorities concerned”234. General 
measures may also include “practical measures such as the refurbishing of a prison, 
an increase in the number of judges or prison personnel or improvements in admin-
istrative arrangements”235.
ii. Who chooses the individual and general measures?
The respondent State is, in principle, free to select and propose the individ-
ual and general measures it intends to adopt, provided that such means are com-
patible with the conclusions set out in the Court’s judgment. This is done under the 
232 These examples are included in Rule 6 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers.
233 In view of the legal difficulties arising within the various national systems as regards the re-opening of pro-
ceedings, the Committee of Ministers has adopted Recommendation No. R (2000) 2. Information concern-
ing the possibilities within the different national systems for re-examination or reopening of cases following 
judgments of the Court may be found on the website of the Council of Europe: https://www.coe.int/en/web/
human-rights-intergovernmental-cooperation/echr-system/implementation-and-execution-judgments/
reopening-cases.
234 These types of general measures are mentioned in Rule 6 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers. 
235 Annual Report 2007 of the Committee of Ministers regarding the Supervision of the Execution of Judgments and 
Decisions of the European Court of Human Rights, p. 16. Examples of general measures suggested or adopted 
by particular countries following a judgment by the Court may be found in this and the other Annual Reports of 
the Committee of Ministers, published by the Department of the Execution of Judgments of the ECtHR (https://
www.coe.int/en/web/execution/annual-reports).
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supervision of the Committee of Ministers, to which the State concerned must sub-
mit an “action plan” indicating the measures that it plans to take or that it has taken 
following a particular judgment of the Court. An “action report” is submitted when 
all measures have been taken. The supervision is concluded with the adoption by the 
Committee of Ministers of a final Resolution when all necessary measures have been 
executed236.
The Court’s role vis-à-vis the choice of the measures necessary to put an end 
to a violation and redress the effects thereof is subsidiary. In that respect, the Court 
has underlined that its competence under Article 41 to award sums by way of just 
satisfaction is meant to provide reparation solely for damage that cannot otherwise be 
remedied (Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy237).
In certain circumstances, however, the Court has moved on to indicate the 
type of measures to be adopted, namely in cases of systemic problems (for example, 
in the case of Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina238, which concerned the issue of 
foreign currency deposited before the dissolution of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia, the Court explicitly stated which measures must be adopted: issuing 
government bonds and paying any outstanding instalments as well as default interest 
in the event of late payment within 6 months of the Court’s final judgment239. See 
also Manushaqe Puto and Others v. Albania240). In certain other cases, the Court has 
stressed that the nature of the violation does not even leave any choice as to the mea-
sures to be taken (for example, in Assanidze v. Georgia241 the Court considered that in 
view of the urgent need to put an end to the violation of Article 5 § 1 and Article 6 § 1 
the applicant’s release must be secured at the earliest possible date242)243.
236 For an overview of the supervision process, see: https://www.coe.int/en/web/execution/the-supervision-process.
237 Scozzari and Giunta v. Italy, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 13 July 2000, no. 39221/98 and 41963/98, paras. 
249-250.
238 Suljagić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, judgment of 3 November 2009, no. 27912/02.
239 Id. para. 64.
240 Manushaqe Puto and Others v. Albania, judgment of 31 July 2012, nos. 604/07 and others.
241 Assanidze v. Georgia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 8 April 2004, no. 71503/01.
242 Id. paras. 202-203.
243 See Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, judgment of 31 May 2011, no. 5829/04, para. 270, where the Court reiterated that 
it “will seek to indicate the type of measure that might be taken only exceptionally” and exemplified the types of 
cases that it has done so in the past.
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iii. The role of the ECtHR and the role of national courts after a final 
judgment
 The Committee of Ministers is responsible for supervising the execution of 
the Court’s judgments and for ensuring that the respondent State abides by the afore-
mentioned obligations. The Court has the competence to deal with issues relating to 
the execution of a judgment only in the following cases:
a) When the Committee of Ministers considers that the supervision of the 
execution of a final judgment is hindered by a problem of interpretation 
of the judgment. In that case, it may refer the matter to the Court under 
Article 46 § 3 for a ruling on the question of interpretation. This possi-
bility was introduced with Protocol 14 and it has not been applied so far.
b) If the Committee of Ministers considers that a State refuses to abide by 
a final judgment, it may bring infringement proceedings under Article 
46 § 4 referring to the Court the question whether that State has failed to 
fulfil its obligation under Article 46 § 1. This power of the Committee of 
Ministers was introduced with Protocol 14 and may be exercised only in 
exceptional circumstances. The procedure’s mere existence, and the threat 
of using it, was expected to act as an effective new incentive to execute the 
Court’s judgments244. 
The Committee of Ministers exercised its power under this Article for the 
first time very recently, bringing infringement proceedings against Azer-
baijan245 for failing to abide by the Court’s final judgment in the case of 
Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan246. The Committee of Ministers had previ-
ously called for the immediate and unconditional release of the applicant 
who is still in prison despite the Court’s findings of fundamental flaws in 
the criminal proceedings.
Other than the above cases, the Court is not involved in the execution of its 
final judgments; as it has already been stressed, the supervision of their execution is 
the task of the Committee of Ministers. This does not mean, however, that the Court 
cannot ever deal with relevant new information in the context of a fresh application.
244 Explanatory Report to Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, paras. 99-100.
245 Interim Resolution CM/ResDH(2017)429, adopted on 5 December 2017.
246 Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan, judgment of 22 May 2014, no. 15172/13.
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In particular, the Court has held that it is competent to examine complaints re-
lated to the non-execution of a particular judgment where there are facts that give rise 
to a fresh violation. For example, in Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Swit-
zerland (No 2)247 the Court held that the domestic court’s refusal to re-open the pro-
ceedings and revise its judgment prohibiting the broadcasting of a commercial, which 
had already been found in breach of the Convention, was based on new grounds not 
previously examined in the Court’s original judgment; the Court was thus able to 
examine the new application248. 
Similarly, the Court has held that it has jurisdiction to examine complaints re-
lated to measures taken by a respondent State to remedy a violation found by the 
Court when these measures raise a new issue undecided by the original judgment. 
In Mehemi v. France249, the Court had held that the enforcement of an order for per-
manent exclusion of the applicant from French territory was a disproportionate in-
terference with the exercise of his right to respect for his private and family life. In 
the subsequent Mehemi v. France (no. 2)250, although no new violation was found in 
the end, the Court asserted its jurisdiction to examine whether the State’s measures 
vis-à-vis the applicant’s immigration status taken following the Court’s first judgment 
constituted a fresh violation251.
Based on the same argument, the Court has also held that, in the context of 
a continuing violation of a Convention right after a judgment by it, it may examine 
a second application concerning a violation of that right in a subsequent period of 
time. For example, in Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia252 the applicants had 
continued to be detained after the Court had found their detention unlawful and had 
asked the respondent State to secure their immediate release; their detention after the 
Court’s original judgment was considered a fresh violation253.
In essence, the above means that until a final judgment is properly executed 
the State will continue to be found in violation of the Convention and be liable to 
pay just satisfaction.
247 Verein gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (VgT) v. Switzerland (No 2), [Grand Chamber] judgment of 30 June 2009, no. 
32772/02.
248 Id. paras. 64-68.
249 Mehemi v. France, judgment of 26 September 1997, no. 25017/94.
250 Mehemi v. France (no. 2), judgment of 10 April 2003, no. 53470/99.
251 Id. paras. 43-44.
252 Ivanţoc and Others v. Moldova and Russia, judgment of 15 November 2011, no. 23687/05.
253 Id. paras. 91-93.
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A limit has, however, been drawn very recently to such an approach when it 
comes to similar applications by different applicants complaining about a violation 
flowing from the same systemic problem that has not been addressed by the domestic 
authorities despite the deliverance by the Court of a pilot judgment. In Burmych and 
Others v. Ukraine254, the Court made clear that it would not continue to examine the 
numerous so called Ivanov-type applications255, which had been pending or which 
would in the future be submitted before it, in an accelerated, simplified summary 
procedure (limited to a statement of a violation and award of just satisfaction); this 
ran the risk of it becoming a mechanism for awarding compensation in substitution of 
the Ukrainian authorities contrary to the principle of subsidiarity256. It acknowledged 
the responsibility it shares with the States for realising the effective implementation 
of the Convention, but underlined that its “competence as defined by Article 19 of 
the Convention and its role under Article 46 of the Convention in the context of the 
pilot-judgment procedure do not extend to ensuring the implementation of its own 
judgments”257.
The above judgment is very recent and the extent to which it will alter the 
Court’s general approach to follow-up cases after a pilot-judgment remains to be 
seen258. What it is certain, however, with respect to any final judgment delivered by 
the Court is that the onus to properly execute it lies on the respondent State and its au-
thorities. At this point, the domestic courts have a crucial role to play. This is partic-
ularly true in cases where the re-opening of proceedings is required, or in cases where 
the individual measures recommended by the Court require decisions of national 
courts (e.g. in parental visitation cases), or when domestic courts are called to apply 
and interpret new legislation adopted as a general measure following a judgment of 
the Court or when they need to adjust their jurisprudence following a judgment that 
finds the implementation of the existing legislation in breach of the Convention.
Equally important is the role of the domestic courts in ensuring that their 
own judgments are being implemented: delays or non-execution of a national court’s 
254 Burmych and Others v. Ukraine [Grand Chamber] judgment (struck out of the list) of 12 October 2017, nos. 
46852/13, 47786/13, 54125/13, 56605/13 and 3653/14.
255 Cases raising issues similar to those assessed in the pilot judgment Yuriy Nikolayevich Ivanov v. Ukraine, judg-
ment of 15 October 2009, no. 40450/04, which concerned prolonged non enforcement of domestic decisions in 
Ukraine.
256 Burmych and Others v. Ukraine, supra note 27, para. 155.
257 Id. para. 193.
258 After all, the Court did clearly state that it may reassess the situation within two years of the delivery of the judg-
ment with a view to considering whether in the meantime there have occurred circumstances such as to justify 
examination of the applications that were struck out of the list with this decision (para. 223).
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judgment may in itself constitute a violation of the Convention (see, for example, 
Burmych and Others v. Ukraine259 mentioned above). In that respect, the Court has 
stressed that the right to a court would be illusory if a Contracting State’s domestic 
legal system allowed a final, binding judicial decision to remain inoperative to the 
detriment of one party (Hornsby v. Greece260). The administrative authorities taken 
as a whole form one element of a State subject to the rule of law; thus, where the 
authorities refuse or fail to comply, or even delay doing so, with a domestic court’s 
judgment, the State will be found in breach of Article 6 of the Convention (Assanidze 
v. Georgia,261 also referencing Hornsby v. Greece).
259 Burmych and Others v. Ukraine [Grand Chamber] judgment (struck out of the list) of 12 October 2017, nos. 
46852/13, 47786/13, 54125/13, 56605/13 and 3653/14.
260 Hornsby v. Greece, judgment of 19 March 1997, no. 18357/91, para. 40.
261 Assanidze v. Georgia, [Grand Chamber] judgment of 8 April 2004, no. 71503/01, para. 183.
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Chapter 4
Applying ECtHR case-law in domestic 
decision-making: principles and guidelines
The application of ECtHR case-law in domestic decision-making rests on the following factors:
• Incorporation of the Convention principles in the domestic legal order;
• Proper positioning of the Convention arguments in the domestic 
decision-making;
• Recognition and conceptualisation of the principle of subsidiarity and the 
margin of appreciation in practical reasoning.
These factors can be viewed as steps in the process of applying Convention 
law in the domestic legal order. Some of them are obligations or requirements on the 
national legislature, some are specific requirements addressed to the executive and all 
of them bear (at least some) relevance in the judicial decision-making in a particular 
case. In any event, these factors provide for a set of optimisation requirements with 
international human rights law making it possible for every domestic legal order to 
find its mode of compliance with the statutory and case-law enactments of that law.
 
I. Incorporation of the Convention principles in the domestic legal order
There are different models or constitutional regimes of incorporation of the 
Convention law in domestic legal orders. In some legal systems, the position of Con-
vention law follows the mode of incorporation of general international public law 
while some legal systems recognise the specific nature of the Convention as a “con-
stitutional instrument of European public order in the field of human rights”.262 Thus 
in every instance where Convention law is relevant to the domestic decision-making 
processes it is necessary to observe: 
• the constitutional arrangement of incorporation of international law in the 
domestic legal order; and
• the (specific) position and nature of the Convention law within such an 
arrangement.
262 Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland [Grand Chamber] judgment of 30 June 
2005, no. 45036/98.
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i. The constitutional arrangement of incorporation of international law
• Two general models: monist and dualist
Generally speaking, there are two traditional theories or modes of incorpora-
tion of international treaties in domestic legal orders: the monist and dualist theory. 
Depending on the theory adhered to; the domestic systems are commonly denoted as 
monist and dualist systems.263
Monist systems perceive the domestic and international law as two comple-
menting parts of a single system. The state authorities and private parties are bound 
by domestic and international law. Moreover, the private parties may invoke their 
rights under international law and request the domestic authorities to honour their 
international legal undertakings.264 In a monist system, the emphasis on the obser-
vance of international law is on the courts which can apply such law in the determi-
nation of a particular case directly.
In reality, the direct application of international law will depend on inter alia 
the following conditions:
• that the treaty in question has obtained binding force as such;
• that it has been accepted into national order through the relevant parlia-
mentary processes (such as ratification); and
• that it has been made public as provided in national law.265
In a dualist system, international and domestic law are two distinct legal or-
ders. International treaty obligations are a result of mutual understanding between 
sovereign states. Accordingly, legal rules adopted can produce legal effects only if 
the parliament of the state concerned transform them into national law. Therefore, 
national legislators hold supremacy and the state authorities and private parties are 
bound by international law to the extent to which it has been implemented in the do-
mestic legal order. It also follows that the emphasis on the observance of international 
law is on the legislator.
263 See further, A. Abashidze, “The Relationship between International Law and Municipal Law: Significance of 
Monism and Dualism Concepts”, in M. Novaković (ed.), Basic Concepts of Public International Law (PF, IUP, 
IMPP, Belgrade, 2013), pp. 23-33.
264 Provided, of course, that the international treaty in question is such that it provides for self-executing rules. On self-executing 
treaties see, for instance, L. Henry, “When Is a Treaty Self-Executing”, 27(7)  Michigan Law Review (1929), pp. 776-785. 
265 See further, European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission), Comments on the imple-
mentation of international human rights treaties in domestic law and the role of courts (CDL(2014)050), 2014.
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• Incorporation of international treaties in the legal order of the coun-
tries in the region
All countries in the region have opted for a monist system; the respective con-
stitutional provisions are included in the following table.
Country Constitutional provision
Albania
Constitution of the Republic of Albania
Article 122 
1. Any international agreement that has been ratified 
constitutes part of the internal juridical system after it is 
published in the Official Journal of the Republic of Albania. 
It is implemented directly, except for cases when it is not 
self-executing and its implementation requires issuance of 
a law. The amendment, supplementation and repeal of laws 
approved by the majority of all members of the Assembly, 
for the effect of ratifying an international agreement, is 
done with the same majority.
2. An international agreement that has been ratified by 
law has superiority over laws of the country that are not 
compatible with it. 
3. The norms issued by an international organization have 
superiority, in case of conflict, on the laws of the country, 
when the agreement ratified by the Republic of Albania 
for its participation in this organization, expressly provide 
for the direct applicability of the norms issued by this 
organisation.




The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina
Annex 4: Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina
Article II: Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
[…]
2. International Standards. The rights and freedoms set 
forth in the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its 
Protocols shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
These shall have priority over all other law.
[…]
4. Non-Discrimination. The enjoyment of the rights and 
freedoms provided for in this Article or in the international 
agreements listed in Annex I to this Constitution shall be 
secured to all persons in Bosnia and Herzegovina without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, color, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, association with a national minority, property, 
birth or other status.
[…]
7. International Agreements. Bosnia and Herzegovina shall 
remain or become party to the international agreements 
listed in Annex I to this Constitution.
Article III 
3. Law and Responsibilities of the Entities and the 
Institutions.
[…]
(b) […] The general principles of international law shall be 
an integral part of the law of Bosnia and Herzegovina and 
the Entities.
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Croatia
Constitution of the Republic of Croatia
Article 141
International treaties which have been concluded and 
ratified in accordance with the Constitution, published and 
which have entered into force shall be a component of the 
domestic legal order of the Republic of Croatia and shall 
have primacy over domestic law. Their provisions may be 
altered or repealed only under the conditions and in the 
manner specified therein or in accordance with the general 
rules of international law.
Kosovo266
Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo
Article 19 [Applicability of International Law]
1. International agreements ratified by the Republic of 
Kosovo become part of the internal legal system after 
their publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Kosovo. They are directly applied except for cases when 
they are not self-applicable and the application requires the 
promulgation of a law.
2. Ratified international agreements and legally binding 
norms of international law have superiority over the laws of 
the Republic of Kosovo.
Macedonia
The Constitution of the Republic of Macedonia
Article 118
International treaties that are ratified in accordance with 
the law constitute integral part of the domestic legal order 
and they could not be amended by law.
Article 2 (1) of the Courts Act
The courts adjudicate and ground their decisions 
and judgments on the basis of the Constitution, laws 
and international treaties which have been ratified in 
accordance with the Constitution.
266
266 Kosovo is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights and is not therefore liable before the Court. 
The rights and freedoms guaranteed by the ECHR are, however, among the rights and freedoms expressly guar-
anteed by Article 22 of its Constitution, according to which they are directly applicable in the Republic of Kosovo 
and, in the case of conflict, have priority over provisions of laws and other acts of public institutions. What is 
more, Article 53 [Interpretation of Human Rights Provisions] provides that “Human rights and fundamental 
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Montenegro
Constitution of Montenegro 
Article 9
The ratified and published international agreements and 
generally accepted rules of international law shall make 
an integral part of the internal legal order, shall have the 
supremacy over the national legislation and shall apply 
directly when they regulate relations differently than the 
national legislation.
Serbia
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia
International relations
Article 16
The foreign policy of the Republic of Serbia shall be based 
on generally accepted principles and rules of international 
law.
Generally accepted rules of international law and ratified 
international treaties shall be an integral part of the legal 
system in the Republic of Serbia and applied directly. 
Ratified international treaties must be in accordance with 
the Constitution.
freedoms guaranteed by this Constitution shall be interpreted consistent with the court decisions of the European 
Court of Human Rights”.
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Serbia
Direct implementation of guaranteed rights
Article 18
Human and minority rights guaranteed by the Constitution 
shall be implemented directly. The Constitution shall 
guarantee, and as such, directly implement human and 
minority rights guaranteed by the generally accepted rules 
of international law, ratified international treaties and laws. 
The law may prescribe manner of exercising these rights 
only if explicitly stipulated in the Constitution or necessary 
to exercise a specific right owing to its nature, whereby 
the law may not under any circumstances influence the 
substance of the relevant guaranteed right. 
Provisions on human and minority rights shall be 
interpreted to the benefit of promoting values of a 
democratic society, pursuant to valid international 
standards in human and minority rights, as well as the 
practice of international institutions which supervise their 
implementation.
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ii. The specific position of Convention law in the domestic legal order
The specific position of Convention law in the domestic legal order is going to 
be examined in terms of two aspects: the specific position of the text of the Conven-
tion in the domestic legal framework and the “domestication” of the Court’s case-law, 
which are analysed under the following titles respectively: “the legal framework vis-
à-vis human rights treaties: supremacy of the Convention or primacy of the Consti-
tution” and “the nature of the Court’s case-law: inter partes legal effects but de facto 
obligations for all State parties”.
• The legal framework vis-à-vis human rights treaties: supremacy of the 
Convention or primacy of the Constitution
In the context of the traditional division of legal systems’ approach to the incor-
poration of international law, emphasis also needs to be placed, as already underlined 
above, on the manner of operation of Convention law in the domestic legal order. 
This is particularly true for cases where the Convention, as a human rights treaty, has 
a special position in the hierarchy of national norms. Such a special position is some-
times described as the supremacy of human rights treaties.267
A telling example of such supremacy of the Convention in the domestic legal 
order exists in the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina.268 Article II.1 of the 
Constitution provides that the State shall ensure the highest level of internationally 
recognised human rights and fundamental freedoms. Moreover, Article II.2 provides 
that the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and the Protocols there-
to shall apply directly in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that these shall have priority 
over all other law. It follows from these provisions that the Convention is above all 
legal norms of national and domestically incorporated international law. Some au-
thors have also suggested that it is above the Constitution itself but the Constitutional 
Court was not ready to recognise such supremacy of the Convention in the domestic 
legal order. In any event, in the legal system of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in accordance 
with the principle of supremacy, the Convention norms are placed at the rank of con-
stitutional principles governing the overall functioning of the domestic legal order.269
267 See further, Venice Commission, Draft report on case-law regarding the supremacy of international human 
rights treaties CDL-DI(2004)005rev, 2004.
268 Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina (1995), with further amendments.
269 See further, M. Ćeman, Constitutional Justice: Doctrine and Case-Law of the Constitutional Court of Bos-
nia and Herzegovina (VII International Legal Forum , Saint Petersburg, Russia) 2017; A. Murtezić, “Relation 
between European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and 
Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina”, 7(13) Human Rights Review (2017), pp. 27-47.
70 Towards a More Effective National Implementation of the European Convention on Human Rights
Another specific example of incorporation of the Convention law in the domestic 
legal order can be observed in the case of Serbia. In fact, the general positioning of the 
Convention in the domestic legal order is rather standard. There is no explicit mention 
of the Convention in the Serbian Constitution270 and the Constitution accepts the classic 
monist theory of incorporation of international treaties. Pursuant to Article 16(2) of the 
Constitution all ratified international treaties, which accordingly applies to the Conven-
tion, must be in accordance with the Constitution. At the same time, pursuant to Article 
194(5) of the Constitution all domestic law shall not be contrary to the ratified interna-
tional treaties and generally accepted rules of the international law. Thus, similarly to 
other monist systems that preserve the principle of primacy of the Constitution, the 
hierarchy of domestic norms is set in the following order:
1. Constitution;
2. international law;
3. laws and other parliamentary enactments;
4. other legal norms of lower order (by-laws; decrees).
What makes the Serbian constitutional positioning of international law, includ-
ing the Convention, specific is the explicit reference in the Constitution to the binding 
nature of the practice of international institutions which supervise the implementa-
tion of international human rights treaties in all domestic decisions concerning hu-
man rights.271 The domestic authorities are therefore reminded in the Constitution, as 
the legal source of the highest order, that the relevant norms of international human 
rights law are not only a set of provisions set out in international agreements but also 
the implicit and often subtle principles of human rights protection flowing from those 
provisions. In the Convention context, this means that the domestic authorities are 
prompted to understand and apply the Convention law as interpreted and applied by 
the Court in its case-law in all matters concerning human rights that fall within their 
relevant jurisdictions.
It is important to stress that this constitutional enactment found in the Serbi-
an legal order, although important for the sake of prominence given to the Court’s 
case-law, remains essentially of a limited legal importance as the domestic authorities 
would, in any event, be obliged to apply the Convention norms in the manner inter-
preted by the Court. In fact, it is through the Court’s case-law that the Convention 
norms are given their proper meaning and the full implementation of the Convention 
in the domestic legal order cannot be achieved without the diligent observance of the 
principles flowing from the Court’s case-law, as will be explained further below.
270 Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (2006).
271 Article 18(3) of the Constitution.  
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• The nature of the Court’s case-law: inter partes legal effects but de facto 
obligations for all State parties
On a theoretical level, the importance of the Court’s case-law for the imple-
mentation of the European human rights standards in the domestic legal orders of the 
Council of Europe Member States can be observed through the following formula of 
“domestication” of international human rights treaties consisting of four progressive 
steps:272
1. Interaction: the relevant actor provokes273 an interaction or series of in-
teractions (Convention disputes) with another274 in a law-declaring forum 
(the Court);
2. Interpretation or enunciation of the applicable (Convention) norm(s) is 
prompted by the fact that there is an interaction (dispute);
3. Internalisation: the action of the moving party coerces the other party to 
respect the legal norm as interpreted by the law-declaring forum and to 
accept the new interpretation of the international norm into its internal 
normative system;
4. Obedience: the respondent party’s perception of a mandatory nature of the 
new interpretation of the norm in its domestic legal order.
Similar conceptualisation of the nature and importance of the Court’s case-law 
flows from the following principle set by the Court itself:
“The Court reiterates at the outset that it has a double role in respect of 
applications lodged under Article 34 of the Convention: (i) to render 
justice in individual cases by way of recognising violations of an in-
jured party’s rights and freedoms under the Convention and Protocols 
thereto and, if necessary, by way of affording just satisfaction and (ii) 
to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted in the Con-
vention, thereby contributing in those ways to the observance by the 
States of the engagements undertaken by them as Contracting Parties.” 
(emphasis added)275
272 See further, H. Hongju Koh, “How is International Human Rights Law Enforced?”, 74(4) Indiana Law Journal 
(1999), p. 1414. Note that this is an adapted Koh’s theory.
273 An individual applicant or a Member State. 
274 The respondent State. 
275 Nagmetov v. Russia [Grand Chamber] judgment of 30 March 2017, no. 35589/08, para. 64.
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In this connection, it is also important to understand the nature of the Court’s 
case-law. In theory, the Court’s judgments and decisions have only inter partes ef-
fects which means that they do not create legal obligations beyond the respondent 
state(s) to the dispute and beyond the particular facts of the case. Moreover, the Court 
is not strictly bound by its previous interpretation of the Convention which means 
that the doctrine of “binding precedent” known to the common law does not apply 
to its case-law.276
However, the Court has itself stressed that only in exceptional circumstances, 
in the case of a good and cogent reason, will it depart from its previous interpretation 
of the Convention,277 which is an expression of the principle of legal certainty in the 
Court’s practice. In practical terms, this means that the Court’s interpretation of the 
Convention creates a predictable set of obligations for the states that apply beyond the 
particular parties and circumstances of a case. The domestic authorities are therefore 
required to follow and apply the Court’s case-law in respect of other states as that 
case-law gives clearer meaning to the particular Convention norms and thus creates 
de facto obligations for all state parties to the Convention.
Lastly, in the context of the incorporation of Convention principles in the do-
mestic legal order, it is important to stress the following principle from the Court’s 
case-law:
“Unlike international treaties of the classic kind, the Convention com-
prises more than mere reciprocal engagements between Contracting 
States. It creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertak-
ings, objective obligations which, in the words of the Preamble benefit 
from a ‘collective enforcement’.”278
In other words, when confronted with a Convention issue, and irrespective 
of the particular mode or system of incorporation of international law in the do-
mestic legal order, the national authorities are obliged to observe the specific na-
ture of the Convention obligations in order to meet their commitments under the 
Convention.
276 D. Harris, M. O’Boyle, E. Bates and C. Buckley, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2014), p. 20.
277 Sabri Güneş v. Turkey [Grand Chamber], judgment of 29 June 2012, no. 27396/06, para. 50.
278 Ireland v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 1978, no. 5310/71, para. 239.
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II. Proper positioning of the Convention arguments in the domestic 
decision-making
The proper positioning of the Convention arguments in the domestic judicial 
decision-making depends on an awareness of the essential nature of the following 
elements or steps:
1. identification of a Convention issue in the case under examination;
2. identification of the applicable Convention norm and the relevant Court’s 
case-law;
3. resolution of the Convention issue at the appropriate stage of the proceed-
ings; and
4. correct and complete application of the Convention law.
Step 1: Identification of a Convention issue in the case under examination
The identification of a Convention issue in a particular case primarily presup-
poses knowledge of the Convention law. It also necessitates a comprehensive and 
meaningful research of the relevant sources of that law. In this connection, the prima-
ry source to be consulted is the Court’s official database of judgments and decisions 
HUDOC.279 In addition, the Court’s Reports of Judgments and Decisions provide for 
a comprehensive overview of the most important judgments and decisions adopted 
by the Court.280
The available summaries and analyses of the case-law, including various hand-
books and commentaries, should also be consulted as sources of information about the 
Convention law. The AIRE Centre’s Legal Bulletin, published quarterly in English and 
BCMS, carries summaries of and expert commentaries on selected recent decisions 
of the European Court of Human Rights and of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union, focusing on cases most relevant to the countries of the Western Balkans. Each 
Bulletin also features an article unpicking a particular issue related to the implementa-
tion of human rights law281. In some jurisdictions, the Court’s rulings concerning that 
State are also published in the official gazette in the national language which may facil-
itate access to Convention law. To the same end, the European Human Rights database 
has been providing access to the jurisprudence of the Court in Bosnian/Croatian/Mon-
tenegrin/Serbian (BCMS), Albanian and Macedonian since 2014282.
279 Available at www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
280 Available at the Court’s website www.echr.coe.int.
281 Available through a searchable database on the following website: http://www.airecentre.org/legal-bulletins.php.
282 Available at www.ehrdatabase.org.
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Very often in practice the identification of a Convention issue in a particu-
lar case is an intellectual process dependent on the personal knowledge of a judge 
or other legal officer working on the case. In some instances, this identification of a 
Convention issue may follow from their personal knowledge and in some instances 
it may be the result of a research based on an argument raised by the parties. In each 
case, there is a wide area of a potentially erroneous and/or incomplete processing of 
a Convention issue if its identification remains dependent on the individual initiative 
of either the advocate or the judge. 
It is therefore advisable for the domestic authorities, notably the courts, to put 
in place a system which will be able to identify that the case under examination gives 
rise to a Convention issue and which will have pre-prepared protocols for its further 
processing. This may be achieved by the establishment of specialised departments 
dealing with the research and advice on the Convention (and other international) law 
or putting in place the relevant administrative protocols for the processing of “Con-
vention cases” within the existing structures of the case-law departments in the courts 
and other state authorities.
Step 2: Identification of the applicable Convention norm and the Court’s 
case-law
• Determining the applicable Convention provision through the identi-
fication of the relevant Court case-law
Following the identification of the case as a “Convention case”, it is necessary 
to determine under which Convention provision the matter complained of falls. In 
some cases this will be obvious and in other cases an answer may follow only after a 
considered analogous conceptualisation of existing Convention law. That will be the 
case where there is no directly applicable case-law of the Court resolving the issue 
under consideration. In such instances, it is particularly important to explain in detail 
what has led the decision-maker to reach the given decision on a particular scope of 
protection of the invoked or applied Convention norm. Such a requirement follows 
from the guarantee of an adequate reasoning implicit in the very concept of due pro-
cess. It is also an indication of the observance of the rule of law and the avoidance of 
arbitrary power in the administration of law.283
The elucidation of the Convention norms is achieved through the case-law of 
the Court. Thus, a mere reference to the Convention norm without a reference to the 
relevant Court’s case-law will very rarely be sufficient. The Court itself has stressed 
283 Lhermitte v. Belgium [Grand Chamber], judgment of 29 November 2016, no. 34238/09, para. 67.
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that “what matters is the reality of the situation rather than appearances, a mere ref-
erence to [a Convention] Article in the domestic decisions is not sufficient; the case 
must have in fact been examined consistently with the standards flowing from the 
Court’s case-law.”284
The citation of a Convention norm without reliance on the Court’s case-law 
may also lead to a potentially incorrect outcome as the text of the Convention norms 
is very broad and often on the face of it very broad. However, the real meaning of the 
norm as determined by the Court in its case-law may be limited and very precise. 
An example in this respect is the provision of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention which 
guarantees “the right to liberty and security of person”. On the face of it this provision 
may be considered as covering various aspects of personal security.285 However, the 
Court has interpreted it narrowly stressing that the phrase “security of the person” 
must be understood in the context of physical liberty rather than physical safety and 
that the inclusion of the word “security” simply serves to emphasise the requirement 
that detention may not be arbitrary.286
In this context, it is crucially important to be mindful of the autonomous 
meaning of the Convention terms (such as “criminal charge”287 and “civil rights and 
obligations”288)289, which may necessitate an analysis of applicability or inapplicability 
of the autonomous concept in question in the case under examination. These are fur-
ther discussed in Chapter 2 of this publication.
• Considerations when navigating through the Court’s case-law
(i) In the event of multiple relevant authorities of the Court’s case-law, the pref-
erence should be given to the case against the country concerned and, in the absence 
of such a case, to the Court’s practice concerning countries with similar legal or-
ders. If the case-law concerning a country with a structurally and conceptually dif-
ferent arrangement of the legal order is used, it is necessary to set the divergences out 
transparently and to explain why that case-law may nevertheless be applicable in the 
284 Neshkov and Others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 27 January 2015, nos. 36925/10 and 5 others, para. 187.
285 See, for instance, Human Rights Committee, Delegado Páez v. Colombia, no. 195/85, 12 July 1990 (Article 9 § 1 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights).
286 Hajduová v. Slovakia, judgment of 30 November 2010, no. 2660/03, para. 54. See also Chapter 2 of this publica-
tion on Key Concepts of the Convention. 
287 A and B v. Norway [Grand Chamber], judgment of 15 November 2016., nos. 24130/11 and 29758/11, paras. 
105-107.
288 Ferrazzini v. Italy [Grand Chamber], judgment of 12 July 2001, no. 44759/98, paras. 23-31.
289 See Chapter 2.VI above for a brief analysis of the most important autonomous concepts of the Convention.
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case under examination. In any event, an automatic transposition of the Convention 
law to a substantially different legal situation will very often lead to a misconceived 
and erroneous outcome. 
(ii) The case-law of the Grand Chamber must be given priority over all other 
case-law of the Court. The Grand Chamber case-law is followed by the case-law ad-
opted at the Chamber level. The practice of the Committees of three judges, which 
are dealing only with the well-established case-law of the Court,290 is of a limited rel-
evance as the Committees should simply apply rather than develop the Court’s case-
law. The jurisprudential authority thus lies in the Grand Chamber or the Chamber 
judgments establishing the relevant principle and their application to a set of facts 
and not in the Committee cases simply applying those principle in subsequent cases 
raising the same legal issues.
(iii) More recent cases should be given precedence over the older cases. More-
over, the level of importance of a judgment as indicated in HUDOC should be 
noted. In particular, the cases marked with the first level of importance (high im-
portance), which made a significant contribution to the case-law, should always be 
consulted. The further, second level (medium importance), are cases which, although 
not making a significant contribution to the case-law, go beyond merely applying the 
existing case-law. The cases of the third level (low importance) are those that simply 
apply the existing case-law and they are usually of a limited importance for the devel-
opment of the domestic practice on the basis of the Court’s case-law.291
(iv) Lastly, in the use of the Court’s case-law, it is important to observe that 
only final cases are used as an authority in the decision-making. In this connection, 
it is important to differentiate the finality of a decision and a judgment.292 A decision 
cannot be referred to the Grand Chamber and it thus becomes final upon its adoption. 
The judgments become final: (1) when the parties declare that they will not request 
that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber; or (2) three months after the date of 
the judgment, if reference of the case to the Grand Chamber has not been requested; 
or (3) when the panel of the Grand Chamber rejects the request to refer the case to its 
jurisdiction.293 The finality is always indicated in HUDOC.
290 Article 28 of the Convention.
291 See further www.hudoc.echr.coe.int.
292 See further on this in Chapter 3 of this publication. 
293 Article 44 § 2 of the Convention.
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Step 3: Resolution of the Convention issue at the appropriate stage of the 
proceedings: a preliminary issue and/or the merits of the case
The third step in the process of proper positioning of Convention arguments in the 
domestic judicial decision-making, following the identification of the Convention issue 
raised in the case and the elucidation of the applicable Convention law for the resolution 
of the case, is the determination of the appropriate stage of the proceedings at which that 
Convention issue must be resolved. Two situations may be differentiated in this context.
First, a Convention issue may arise with regard to a preliminary issue in the 
case.294 In such instances, a further determination of the merits of the case, without 
the resolution of the preliminary issue, may be impossible or lead to an erroneous 
outcome. Thus, as a rule, before proceeding with a further step in the determination 
of the merits of the case, the preliminary issue will have to be addressed and resolved.
Second, a Convention issue may arise in the context of the merits of the case295 
without any implications for the preliminary issues in the case. In these instances, the 
further steps in the examination of the merits of the case will be possible without the intro-
duction of the Convention arguments already at the preliminary stage of the proceedings. 
The difficult cases in this context are those where it is impossible to draw a 
clear distinction between a preliminary issue and a matter on the merits from the 
Convention point of view. Moreover, in some cases the decision on the preliminary 
issue will so closely be linked to the decision on the merits that it will be impossible 
to separate them. For instance, an issue may arise as to the question whether an indi-
vidual has a legally protected legitimate property expectation amounting to a “posses-
sion” within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. At the same time, in case of 
a denial of such a property claim by a domestic authority, an issue will arise whether 
such a denial is in compliance with the property protection guaranteed under that 
provision. Thus, the preliminary issue (the existence of a “possession”) and the issue 
on the merits (denial of protection of the property claim) will inextricably be linked 
together that it will be impossible to separate them. This conceptual perplexity was 
explained in the Court’s case-law in the following manner:
“A negative answer to [the question of the existence of legitimate prop-
erty expectations] will consequently lead the Court to a finding that the 
[denial of the property claim] did not amount to an interference with 
294 For instance, an issue of admissibility of evidence allegedly obtained in breach of the rights protected under the 
Convention. 
295 For instance, as a question of the justification of restriction on the freedom of expression in a defamation case. 
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[the] property rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 given that the 
applicant would not have a proprietary interest falling within Article 1 
of Protocol No. 1 …
However, by contrast, if the Court finds that the applicant satisfied the 
requirements as set out by the relevant … legislation, then the [denial 
of the property claim] will be regarded as an interference with the ap-
plicant’s property interests which was not in accordance with the law as 
required under the Convention. Such a conclusion will make it unnec-
essary for the Court to ascertain whether a fair balance has been struck 
between the demands of the general interest of the community and the 
requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights in 
finding a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No.1 …”296
In these cases the preliminary issue will have to be joined to the examination 
of the merits of the case and resolved at the same time. For the purpose of trans-
parency and clarity in the analysis a clear indication of a postponement of the Con-
vention analysis for a later stage in the reasoning will have to be made. Moreover, 
at the moment of the determination of the matter, an explicit cross-reference to the 
earlier deferment of the decision should be made. A similar method is employed by 
the Court in its examination of cases giving rise to the conceptual perplexity at issue. 
In such cases, the Court joins the assessment on the admissibility of an application to 
its assessment of the merits of the case. It thereby makes an explicit decision to join 
the assessment of admissibility to the merits and to reject or uphold the admissibility 
objection.297
Step 4: Correct and complete application of the Convention law
With regard to the last element in the above-indicated four-step test to the 
proper positioning of the Convention arguments in the domestic judicial deci-
sion-making, namely the requirement of a correct and complete application of the 
Convention law, it is salutary to reiterate that whenever a Convention issue arises in 
a case, the domestic courts should be mindful that “[when] pleas deal with the ‘rights 
and freedoms’ guaranteed by the Convention and the Protocols thereto, the national 
courts are required to examine them with particular rigour and care.”298 This “partic-
ular rigour and care” may also be determined as a “correct and complete” application 
of the Convention law.
296 Damjanac v. Croatia, judgment of 24 October 2013, no. 52943/10, paras. 88 and 89.
297 For instance, Petrović v. Serbia, judgment of 15 July 2014, no. 40485/08, paras. 65 and 98.
298 Wagner and J.M.W.L. v. Luxembourg, judgment of 28 June 2007, no. 76240/01, para. 96.
79Guide to Key Convention Principles and Concepts and Their Use in Domestic Courts
• “Correctness”
(i) The correctness in the application of the Convention law means that the 
use of the particular case-law in the domestic decision-making must be made with 
due regard to the legal context and the factual and legal background in which it 
developed. A common fallacy that arises in this context concerns the transposition 
of the principles developed in a particular legal and factual context to a conceptually 
different legal situation. This is usually the result of the reading and use of a particular 
wording of a judgment or decision out of its legal context and the overall understand-
ing of the principle which that wording expresses. The avoidance of this fallacy should 
rigorously be observed,
(ii) Another aspect of the requirement of “correctness” is a precision in the 
citation. This requires that the sources used in the analysis must be verified and prop-
erly referenced so that, if need be, they are easily identifiable. In particular, a reference 
to the Convention principles should always be made by setting out the name of the 
case in which those principles have developed, the source consulted and the relevant 
paragraph(s) number(s) in the judgment or decision which contain(s) the principle 
relied upon in the decision-making. A mere reference made to the name of a case is 
not a proper and complete citation of a judgment or decision used for the resolution 
of a particular legal matter.
• “Completeness”
There are two principle aspects of the requirement of “completeness” in the 
application of the Convention law. First concerns the question of internal consistency 
and harmony of the Convention law and the second concerns the harmony of the 
Convention law with other sources of international law.
(i) With regard to the first aspect of completeness, the Court has stressed that 
“the Convention must be read as a whole, and interpreted in such a way as to promote 
internal consistency and harmony between its various provisions.”299 Thus, for in-
stance, in the matters concerning the effects of educational practices on the religious 
beliefs of an individual, the right to respect for freedom of religion under Article 9 
of the Convention will have to be read in accordance with the principles developed 
under the right to education guaranteed in Article 2 of Protocol No 1, irrespective of 
the fact that this latter provision itself may not be directly applicable.300
299 Catan and Others v. Moldova and Russia [Grand Chamber], judgment of 19 October 2012, nos. 43370/04 and 
others, para. 136.
300 See, for instance, Osmanoğlu and Kocabaş v. Switzerland, judgment of 10 January 2017, no. 29086/12, para. 90.
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(ii) As to the second aspect of the requirement of completeness of the applica-
tion of the Convention law, the Court has held that the Convention should always be 
interpreted and applied in a manner which secures harmony with other sources of 
international law of which it forms part.301 An example in this respect concerns the 
interpretation and application of the right to respect for family life under Article 8 of 
the Convention in the transnational child custody cases in accordance with interna-
tional law on the civil aspects of international abduction of children.302 
In both aspects of completeness of the application of the Convention law, the 
domestic decision-maker should adequately be informed and attentive to the Con-
vention law read as a whole and to various sources of international law on the legal 
matter under examination. This presupposes adequate knowledge and understanding 
of the relevant legal sources and their diligent and proper application in the deci-
sion-making processes.
III. Recognition and conceptualisation of the principle of subsidiarity and 
the margin of appreciation in practical reasoning
i. Subsidiarity: Cooperation in securing effective enforcement of human 
rights protection
The concept of subsidiarity is gaining significant prominence in the arrange-
ment of relations between the national and international jurisdictions on the matter 
of effective enforcement of human rights protection.303 In such an arrangement, the 
protection guaranteed at the national level is intended to be of a primary order and 
the protection at international level secondary. Moreover, the national authorities en-
joy a certain margin of appreciation in their securing of rights guaranteed under the 
Convention and the Court cannot intervene in their judgment if they have not over-
stepped that margin of appreciation.304
It is salutary to reiterate that the concept of subsidiarity is essentially about the 
obligation on states to apply Convention standards correctly and effectively. It does 
not presuppose an unfettered and unconditional deference to the domestic authori-
ties to enforce the internationally recognised standards of human rights protection. 
The limits of such deference can be explained in the following manner:
301 Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [Grand Chamber], judgment of 21 November 2001, no. 35763/97, para. 55.
302 See, for instance, X v. Latvia [Grand Chamber], judgment of 26 November 2013, no. 27853/09, paras. 92-108.
303 See further, R. Spano, “Universality or Diversity of Human Rights?: Strasbourg in the Age of Subsidiarity”, 14(3) 
Human Rights Law Review (2014), pp. 487-502.
304 See further on the concepts of subsidiarity and margin of appreciation, supra Chapter 2.V. 
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“[T]he assertion of subsidiarity cannot be viewed as a simple equation of 
primacy but rather as a resultant of the harmonisation of relevant stan-
dards at the level of national and international jurisdictions. In other 
words, subsidiarity should be viewed as a complex interplay of confi-
dence, responsibility and assistance in securing expansive human rights 
protection. There is, therefore, a close correlation between subsidiarity 
and the necessity of effective implementation of international human 
rights standards in the domestic legal systems.”305
ii. Key legal concepts that reflect the principle of subsidiarity
In practical reasoning this complex interplay of national and international ad-
ministration of justice expressed through the concept of subsidiarity is principally 
reflected in the following legal concepts:
• exhaustion of domestic remedies;
• factual findings of the domestic courts;
• interpretation of national law;
• decision-making within the designated margin of appreciation. 
• Exhaustion of domestic remedies: an opportunity to resolve the prob-
lems domestically
The requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies is a keystone of the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity. It rests on the complementarity between the requirements of 
Articles 13 and 35 § 1 of the Convention. Under Article 13 of the Convention the 
domestic system is obliged to provide for effective remedies capable of addressing and 
redressing an individual’s Convention grievances. At the same time, under Article 35 
§ 1 of the Convention, every individual who wishes to invoke his or her Convention 
rights at the international level is obliged to exhaust such remedies and thereby allow 
the national authorities to address (and redress) his or her Convention grievances 
before they can be raised at the international level.
This complementarity, underlining the principle of subsidiarity, is explained in 
the following manner in the Court’s case-law:
305 A. Uzun Marinković and K. Kamber, Fostering Domestication of Human Rights through the Exhaustion of Do-
mestic Remedies: A Lesson Learned from the ECtHR Pilot and Leading Judgment Procedures, 2 Inter-American 
and European Human Rights Journal (2016), p. 336.
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“It is a fundamental feature of the machinery of protection established 
by the Convention that it is subsidiary to the national systems safeguard-
ing human rights. This Court is concerned with the supervision of the 
implementation by Contracting States of their obligations under the 
Convention. It should not take on the role of Contracting States, whose 
responsibility it is to ensure that the fundamental rights and freedoms 
enshrined therein are respected and protected on a domestic level. The 
rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is based on the assumption – 
reflected in Article 13 of the Convention, with which it has close affinity 
– that there is an effective remedy available in respect of the alleged 
violation (emphasis added). The rule is therefore an indispensable part 
of the functioning of this system of protection. 
…
It is the Convention complaint which must have been aired at national 
level for there to have been exhaustion of “effective remedies”. It would 
be contrary to the subsidiary character of the Convention machinery if 
an applicant, ignoring a possible Convention argument, could rely on 
some other ground before the national authorities for challenging an im-
pugned measure, but then lodge an application before the Court on the 
basis of the Convention argument …”306
The requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies is essentially to the bene-
fit of the domestic authorities as they are given a possibility to remedy the situation 
complained of and thus to forestall the finding of a violation of the Convention at 
international level. It is also to the benefit of the individual concerned as the reso-
lution of the case at the domestic level provides for a more efficient and usually more 
effective manner of protection of individual rights. The rule of exhaustion of domes-
tic remedies must therefore be taken seriously by all the relevant stakeholders in the 
process of achieving an effective human rights protection under the Convention.
• Factual findings of the domestic courts
When the domestic authorities are called upon to determine a human rights 
issue, the Court will usually give deference to the establishment of the relevant facts 
and in particular to their interpretation of national law made by the domestic courts.
In this connection, with regard to the findings of fact in particular, the Court 
has stressed that although it is not bound by the findings of domestic courts and 
306 Vučković and Others v. Serbia (preliminary objection) [Grand Chamber], judgment of 25 March 2014, nos. 
17153/11 and 29 others, paras. 69 and 75.
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remains free to make its own appreciation in the light of all the material before it, in 
normal circumstances it requires cogent elements to lead it to depart from the find-
ings of fact reached by the domestic courts.307
This does not mean, however, that the Court will uncritically accept any finding 
of fact reached by the domestic courts. As a rule, the Court will not intervene in the 
domestic authorities’ assessment of the relevant facts in so far as their reason-
ing in this respect is not arbitrary or manifestly unreasonable.308 The Court has 
also explained that it cannot rely blindly on the decisions of the domestic authorities, 
especially when they are obviously inconsistent or contradict each other. In such a 
situation the Court has to assess the evidence available to it in its entirety and reach 
its own conclusion of fact.309 
Moreover, some allegations of a breach of the Convention rights, such as the 
right to life under Article 2, will require a more stringent assessment by the Court 
of the factual situation established by the domestic courts, particularly where there 
is an allegation of the lack of an effective investigation. In particular, the Court has 
held that “[i]n the light of the importance of the protection afforded by Article 2, the 
Court must subject complaints of loss of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into 
consideration all relevant circumstances”.310
Similarly, the very nature of some Convention complaints will require the 
Court to examine whether all relevant facts have been established in an acceptable 
manner from the Convention point of view and whether the application of law to 
those facts is in compliance with the Convention requirements. A telling example 
in this respect is the protection of the freedom of speech under Article 10 where the 
Court has held the following: 
“The Court’s task, in exercising its supervisory jurisdiction, is not to 
take the place of the competent national authorities but rather to review 
under Article 10 the decisions they delivered pursuant to their power 
of appreciation. This does not mean that the supervision is limited to 
ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its discretion rea-
sonably, carefully and in good faith; what the Court has to do is to look 
at the interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and 
determine whether it was ‘proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued’ 
307 Giuliani and Gaggio v. Italy [Grand Chamber], judgment of 24 March 2011, no. 23458/02, para.180.
308 Bochan v. Ukraine (No. 2) [Grand Chamber], judgment of 5 February 2015, no. 22251/08, para. 61.
309 Dzemyuk v. Ukraine, judgment of 4 September 2014, no. 42488/02, para. 80.
310 Banel v. Lithuania, judgment of 18 June 2013, no. 14326/11, para. 67.
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and whether the reasons adduced by the national authorities to justify it 
are ‘relevant and sufficient’ ... In doing so, the Court has to satisfy itself 
that the national authorities applied standards which were in conformity 
with the principles embodied in Article 10 and, moreover, that they re-
lied on an acceptable assessment of the relevant facts ...”311
• Interpretation of national law primarily by the domestic courts
With regard to the interpretation of national law, the Court has often stressed 
that it is primarily for the national authorities, notably the courts, to interpret and 
apply domestic law.312 The Court’s powers in this respect are very limited. They have 
been determined in the following manner:
“The Court recalls that it is primarily for the national authorities, in 
particular the courts, to resolve problems of interpretation of domestic 
legislation. The Court’s role is limited to verifying whether the effects 
of such interpretation are compatible with the Convention (empha-
sis added). That being so, save in the event of evident arbitrariness, it 
is not for the Court to question the interpretation of the domestic law 
by the national courts … Thus, where the superior national courts have 
analysed in a comprehensive and convincing manner the precise nature 
of the impugned restriction …, on the basis of the relevant Convention 
case-law and principles drawn therefrom, this Court would need strong 
reasons to differ from the conclusion reached by those courts by sub-
stituting its own views for those of the national courts on a question of 
interpretation of domestic law …”313
It should be noted from these principles that the subsidiarity, in the form of 
deference to the domestic courts’ interpretation of national law, is not unfettered and, 
in order for it to come into force, a serious and diligent approach by the domestic 
courts needs to be demonstrated. In other words, the decisions of the domestic courts 
should be free from any indication of arbitrariness. Arbitrariness in this context 
can be understood as a lack of any reasons for the decision or if the reasons given are 
based on a manifest factual or legal error committed by the domestic court, resulting 
in a denial of justice.314
311 Morice v. France [Grand Chamber], judgment of 23 April 2015, no. 29369/10, para. 124.
312 Karácsony and Others v. Hungary [Grand Chamber], judgment of 17 May 2016, nos. 42461/13 and 44357/13, 
para. 123.
313 Károly Nagy v. Hungary [Grand Chamber], judgment of 14 September 2017, no. 56665/09, para. 62.
314 Moreira Ferreira v. Portugal (no. 2) [Grand Chamber], judgment of 11 July 2017, no. 19867/12, para. 85. 
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Moreover, in principle the Court has no power to review the domestic legis-
lation in the abstract. It has explained that in proceedings originating in an individ-
ual application, it is not called upon to review the legislation at issue in the abstract 
but has to confine itself, as far as possible, to an examination of its application to the 
concrete case before it.315
In some instances, however, in order for the Court to ascertain whether the in-
terference complained of was “in accordance with the law”316, it will necessarily have 
to engage in some degree of abstraction and examine whether the applicable domestic 
law as such complied with the fundamental principle of the rule of law.317 A telling 
example in this context concerns complaints of unlawful secret surveillance where the 
Court will inevitably need to examine the domestic legislative arrangement allowing 
for such an interference with the right to respect for private life and confidentiality of 
correspondence guaranteed under Article 8 of the Convention before examining its 
effects in the particular case under examination.
Similarly, some Convention provisions by their very nature require the Court 
to engage in the interpretation of domestic law. This concerns, for instance, Article 5 
§ 1 of the Convention which provides that any deprivation of liberty of an individual 
must be lawful, namely in accordance with the substantive and procedural provisions 
of domestic law. In such instances, the Court as stressed that:
“While it is normally in the first place for the national authorities, notably 
the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law, the position is different 
in relation to cases where failure to comply with such law entails a breach 
of the Convention. This applies, in particular, to cases in which Article 
5 § 1 of the Convention is at stake and the Court must then exercise a 
certain power to review whether national law has been observed …”318
• Decision-making within the designated margin of appreciation
Lastly, the expression of subsidiarity through the domestic authorities’ power 
to determine the matters in dispute within the scope of their margin of appreciation 
is a well-enshrined principle in the Court’s case-law. In particular, the Court has often 
stressed that when exercising its supervisory function, its task is not to take the place 
of the national courts, but rather to review, in the light of the case as a whole, whether 
315 Travaš v. Croatia, judgment of 4 October 2016, no. 75581/13, para. 83.
316 See above Chapter 2.VI.ii under the concept of “quality of law”.
317 Dragojević v. Croatia, judgment of 15 January 2015, no. 68955/11, para. 86.
318 Creangă v. Romania [Grand Chamber], judgment of 23 February 2012, no. 29226/03, para. 101.
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the decisions they have taken pursuant to their power of appreciation are compatible 
with the Convention.319 Accordingly, if the domestic authorities have relied on the 
Court’s case-law determining the scope of the margin of appreciation in a par-
ticular case and carefully applied all the relevant principles of that case-law, the 
Court is unlikely to find the possibility to intervene in their decision on the mer-
its of the case provided that it remained within that designated margin.
Conclusion
The above-indicated factors can be used as guiding principles in the application 
of the Convention law at the domestic level. They are, however, only general indica-
tions of an appropriate process of application of the Convention law at the national 
level. They do not provide any substantive solutions for the resolution of a case nor do 
they guarantee a substantive validity of the outcome. 
Nevertheless, presupposing that the substantive Convention law is known to 
the relevant decision-maker, the level of observance of these factors in a particular 
case can proportionately determine the level of compliance with the Convention law 
as they allow for a proper transposition of that law in the domestic courts’ judgments 
and decisions. In other words, an assumption can be made that the higher level of ob-
servance of these factors will lead to a higher level of compliance with the Convention 
law. It is therefore hoped that the domestic courts will seek to rely on these guiding 
principles in order to secure an effective compliance with the Convention law.
319 See, for instance, Von Hannover v. Germany (no. 2) [Grand Chamber], judgment of 7 February 2012, nos. 
40660/08 and 60641/08, para. 105. 
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